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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and Article 91 of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea each provide that there must exist a “genuine link” 
between a ship and the State purporting to confer its nationality upon that ship.  Neither 
Convention, however, defines or states what is meant by a genuine link, nor does either 
Convention stipulate what consequences (if any) follow where no genuine link exists.  The 
purpose of this study is to try to discover what is meant by a genuine link and what 
consequences follow from its absence.  The method that has been used to carry out this 
exercise has been to employ the canons of treaty interpretation laid down in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.  This has involved an examination of the ordinary 
meaning of Article 5 of the 1958 Convention and Article 91 of the 1982 Convention in their 
context and in the light of the object and purpose of those Conventions, as well as utilising as 
subsidiary means of interpretation the travaux préparatoires of each Convention.  In 
addition, the relevant case law of international courts and tribunals has been examined, as 
well as the views of writers. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no consensus among either States or writers as to what 
is meant by a genuine link or as to the consequences that follow from its absence, it is 
nevertheless believed that the following conclusions may legitimately be drawn.   
 
1. Registration of a ship, thereby granting it the nationality of the registering State, 
obviously creates a link between the ship and that State. Registration does not in 
itself, however, make that link genuine.  There must exist circumstances which 
mean that the link is a real one, not artificial, casual or tenuous. 
2. There is no single or obligatory criterion by which the genuineness of a link is to 
be established.  A State has a discretion as to how it ensures that the link between 
itself and a ship having its nationality is genuine, be it through requirements relating 
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to the nationality of the beneficial owner or crew, its ability to exercise its 
jurisdiction over such a ship, or in some other way.  
3. Although it is not an obligatory criterion for establishing the genuineness of a link, 
the effective exercise of jurisdiction and control over its ships is one of the 
principal ways in which a flag State may demonstrate that the link between itself 
and its ships is genuine.  To demonstrate that it is able effectively to exercise its 
jurisdiction and control over a ship, a State must be able to show that the 
necessary mechanisms for such exercise are in place at the time when the ship is 
granted its nationality.  Such mechanisms could include sufficient and suitably 
qualified personnel for carrying out the necessary surveys of the ship, checking the 
certification of the crew, etc. 
4. Where there is no genuine link between a ship and the State purporting to confer 
its nationality upon it, that State may not exercise diplomatic protection in respect 
of the ship.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Article 5(1) of the Convention on the High Seas, 1958 provides as follows: 
 
 Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality 
 to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the 
 right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose 
 flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between 
 the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively  
 exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical 
 and social matters over ships flying its flag. (emphasis added) 
 
In similar vein Article 91(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 
provides: 
 
 Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality 
 to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the 
 right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose 
 flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between 
 the State  and the ship. (emphasis added) 
  
These provisions give rise to two questions: 
 1. What is meant by “a genuine link” between a ship and the State which has 
purported to confer its nationality upon that ship? 
 2. What consequences follow where there is no “genuine link” between a ship and 
the State which has purported to confer its nationality upon that ship? 
 
No direct answer to these questions is provided by either Convention. It is the aim of this 
study to attempt to suggest answers to these questions. This will be done by trying to 
interpret the provisions of the two Conventions in accordance with the rules of international 
law relating to the interpretation of treaties contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. The reason for engaging in what might appear to some to be a rather technical 
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exercise is in order to adopt as objective an approach as possible.This is felt to be 
particularly necessary as a good deal of the extensive writing on the isssue of the genuine link 
has tended to be rather partisan and selective in its use of evidence to support a particular 
point of view. 
 
Accordingly, section 2 of this study sets out, fairly concisely, the rules on treaty 
interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Section 3 then 
attempts to interpret Article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas in the light of these 
rules, while section 4 engages in a similar exercise in respect of Article 91 of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. It should be noted here that although the 1958 
Convention has been replaced by the 1982 Convention as between parties to the latter1, the 
1958 Convention remains important and worthy of study because a number of States are 
parties to the 1958 Convention which have not (yet) become parties to the 1982 
Convention and because (as will be seen in section 4) the provisions of Article 5 served as 
the basis for drafting the provisions of the 1982 Convention concerning the nationality of 
ships. Section 5 of this study examines a number of developments since the conclusion of the 
1982 Convention which may shed some light on what is meant by “a genuine link”. Finally 
Section 6 offers some general conclusions as to the meaning of “genuine link” and the 
consequences that follow where there is no “genuine link” between a vessel and the State 
which has purported to confer its nationality upon that vessel.  
 
At the outset it must be pointed out that it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the 
policy issues relating to the nationality of ships in general, and the genuine link in particular, 
although the author of this study is aware of what those issues are. The present study is, 
therefore, a strictly legal one. 
 
 
                                                             
1 See Art. 311(1) of the 1982 Convention. 
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2.  RULES ON TREATY INTERPRETATION 
 
Rules on treaty interpretation, albeit in fairly general terms, are contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,2 in Articles 31-33.  Article 31(1) of the 
Convention contains the basic principle of treaty interpretation.  It reads as follows: 
 
 A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be  given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
 
Paragraph two of Article 31 provides that the context for this purpose includes not only the 
text of the treaty (including its preamble and any annexes) but also any agreement relating to 
the treaty which was made by the parties in connection with its conclusion or any instrument 
made by the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted as related 
to the treaty.  Paragraph three of Article 31 provides that there is to be taken into account, 
together with the context, “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” and “any subsequent practice 
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation.”   
 
Article 32 provides that: 
 
 Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory  work 
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning  resulting from the 
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the  interpretation according to Article 31:  
 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
 (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
Finally Article 33 deals with treaty texts which are in more than one authentic language.  
Paragraph one provides that when a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages 
the text is equally authentic in each language.  Paragraph three provides that the terms of the 
treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.  Paragraph four 
                                                             
2 Text in United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331.  
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provides that when comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning 
which the application of Articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best 
reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.   
 
Article 4 of the Vienna Convention provides that the Convention applies only to treaties 
which are concluded by States after its entry into force.  Since the Vienna Convention did 
not enter into force until 1980, it does not as such apply to interpretation of the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas.  However, the International Court of Justice has on several 
occasions stated that the rules contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention also 
represent customary international law: see, for example, the Territorial Dispute 
(Libya/Chad) case3, the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
(Bahrain/Qatar) case4, the Oil Platforms (Iran/USA) case (Prelminary Obections)5 and, 
most recently, the Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) case.6  The Court has also 
suggested that the provisions of Article 32 represent customary international law: see the 
cases just referred to7 as well as the Guinea Bissau/Senegal case.8  Although the 
International Court does not appear to have pronounced on the question of whether Article 
33 represents customary international law, the European Court of Human Rights has taken 
the view that it does: see, for example, Golder v UK9 and James v UK10. Thus, the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention concerning the interpretation of treaties also represent 
customary international law and therefore may be applied to interpretation of the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas, as well as, qua Convention,  to the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. 
 
 
3. THE CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS, 1958 
 
                                                             
3 [1994] ICJ Rep. 6 (para. 41). 
4 [1995] ICJ Rep. 6 (para. 33). 
5 [1996] II ICJ Rep. 812 (para. 23).  
6 (2000) 39 International Legal Materials 310, para. 18. 
7 Libya/Chad  case, paras. 41 and 55; Bahrain/Qatar case, para. 40; and Botswana/Namibia case, paras. 20 
and 46. 
8 [1991] ICJ Rep. 52 (para. 48). 
9 Series A No 18 (1975), para. 29. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The Convention on the High Seas11 was adopted at the First United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva in 1958.  The Convention came into force on 
September 30, 1962.  The Convention currently has 62 parties. As pointed out earlier, the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea prevails over the 1958 Convention as between 
parties to it.  About two-thirds of the current parties to the 1958 Convention are also parties 
to the 1982 Convention.  Thus, the 1958 Convention at the present time applies only 
between about 21 States, but they include two States with a significant interest in shipping, 
Denmark and the USA. Notwithstanding this, the Convention remains of great importance 
for the reasons that were explained earlier in the Introduction.   
 
Article 5(1) of the High Seas Convention, which was reproduced at the beginning of the 
Introduction above, provides that there must exist a “genuine link” between a ship and the 
State which has purported to confer its nationality upon that ship.  An attempt will now be 
made to interpret the meaning of the term “genuine link” and to ascertain the consequences 
that follow where there is no “genuine link” between a ship and the State which has 
purported to confer its nationality upon that ship, employing the rules on treaty interpretation 
set out in the Vienna Convention, which were discussed in the previous section.   
 
 
3.2 A Preliminary Approach to Interpretation 
 
The first point to note is that the Convention is in five authentic languages - English, French, 
Spanish, Chinese and Russian.  Unfortunately the author of this study has no knowledge of 
either Chinese or Russian.  These language versions of the Convention will therefore not be 
discussed.  The French text of Article 5 reads as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 Series A No 98 (1986), para. 42. 
11 Text in United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 450, p. 11. 
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 Chaque État fixe les conditions auxquelles il accorde sa nationalité aux navires ainsi que les 
 conditions d’immatriculation et du droit de battre son pavillon.  Les navires possèdent la  nationalité de 
l’État dont ils sont autorisés à battre pavillon.  Il doit exister un lien substantiel  entre l’État et le navire; 
l’État doit notamment exercer effectivement sa juridiction et son  contrôle, dans les domaines technique, 
administratif et social, sur les navires battant son  pavillon. 
 
The Spanish text of Article 5 reads as follows: 
 
 Cada Estado establecerá los requisitos necessarios para conceder su nacionalidad a los  buques, asi 
como para que puedan ser inscritos en su territorio en un registro y tengan el  derecho de enarbolar su bandera.  
Los buques poseen la nacionalidad del Estado cuya  bandera están autorizados a enarbolar.  Ha de existir 
una relación auténtica entre el Estado y  el buque; en particular, el Estado ha de ejercer efectivamente su 
jurisdicción y su autoridad  sobre los buques que enarbolen su pabellón, en los aspectos administrativo, técnico y 
 social. 
 
It will be recalled that under Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties the 
different language versions of a treaty are equally authentic and are presumed to have the 
same meaning: where there are differences of meaning which the application of Articles 31 
and 32  does not remove, then the meaning which best reconciles the texts should be 
adopted.  At this stage it is sufficient to note that there may be some difference of meaning 
between the English “genuine link” and the French “lien substantiel” (“substantial” or 
“significant” “link”). On the other hand, the Spanish text (“relación auténtica” - “authentic” 
or “genuine” “connection”) appears to have the same meaning as the English text.  As 
regards the phrase “in particular”, both the French “notamment” and the Spanish “en 
particular” appear to have the same meaning and emphasis as the English text.12  The 
possible differences in the meaning of the various authentic texts will be returned to after (as 
Article 33 of the Vienna Convention directs) an attempt has been made to interpret Article 
5(1) of the High Seas Convention by applying Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
 
                                                             
12 But note that one writer has argued that the French “notamment” carries a different emphasis from “in 
particular” and means essentially “that is”: see B. Boczek, Flags of Convenience: An International Legal 
Study  (1962), p. 275. Consultation of French dictionaries and a British expert in the French language suggests that 
Boczek is mistaken. Meyers also believes Boczek to be mistaken: see H. Meyers, The Nationality of Ships 
(1967), p. 219.    
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Accortdingly,  we begin by trying to interpret the term “genuine link” by applying Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention. This Article directs us to interpret a particular provision of a 
treaty in good faith in accordance with its ordinary meaning in its context and in the light of 
the object and purpose of the treaty concerned.  There are therefore three things to be 
looked at: the ordinary meaning of the provision, the context, and the object and purpose of 
the treaty.  As regards the ordinary meaning of the term “genuine link”, there is no definition 
of this term in the Convention.  It will become clear, when the drafting history of the 
Convention is examined in section 3.3 below, that this is not a term with an established 
meaning in international law. The High Seas Convention is the first treaty having provisions 
on the nationality of ships, so that there is no earlier history of the use of this or similar terms 
in treaties dealing with ships.  Nor can any help be gleaned from looking at treaties 
concerned with the nationality of individuals or aircraft because such conventions do not use 
the term “genuine link” or any similar expression.13  Taking the term “genuine link” at face 
value and in its ordinary sense, it appears to mean that there must be a link or connection 
between a ship and the State purporting to to grant its nationality to that ship, and that that 
link must be genuine or real, as opposed to sham, artificial, casual or tenuous. Sinclair 
cautions, however, that the “ordinary meaning” of a term “does not necessarily result from a 
pure grammatical analysis”, and that “there is no such thing as an abstrct ordinary meaning 
of a phrase” divorced from its context and practical application. 14      
 
Turning to the context of the High Seas Convention, of the various materials mentioned in 
Article 31(2) as relating to the context of a treaty, the only one that exists in the case of the 
High Seas Convention is the text of the Convention itself.  There is one provision of this text 
which is relevant in this connection. That is Article 6(1), which provides that “a ship may not 
change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of 
ownership or change of registry.” This provision implies that a change of flag (i.e. a change 
of nationality) is not to be undertaken lightly or casually, but only where there is a real 
transfer of ownership of the ship, suggesting that the new shipowner must have some real 
                                                             
13 See, for example, the Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, 1930, 
Art. 1 (League of Nations Treaty Series , Vol. 179, p. 89) and Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944, 
Arts. 17-21 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 15, p. 295). 
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connection with the new State of nationality, or where there is a real change of registry, i.e. 
that there is some real connection with the new registry.15  
 
In terms of the materials referred to in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention that are to be 
taken into account with the context, the only possible one is “any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation.”  Sinclair points out that the value and significance of subsequent practice 
“depends on the extent to which it is concordant, common and consistent”, and adds that a 
practice cannot in general be established by one isolated act or even by several individual 
applications.16  In similar vein the International Court of Justice in the recent 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island case emphasised that the practice of the parties to a treaty must 
demonstrate a common understanding of its meaning to be relevant as practice within the 
meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.17   
 
There is considerable practice by States parties to the High Seas Convention in the form of 
the national legislation they have enacted relating to the nationality of ships.18  The legislation 
of the 53 States parties to the High Seas Convention having a merchant navy varies 
considerably, however.  In a recent study by Li and Wonham, 19 the legislation of States is 
divided into three categories: open registers (which equate to flags of convenience); closed 
registers (by which is meant registers that set requirements as to ownership, management 
and manning); and compromise registers (by which is meant registers which use conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edition, 1984), p. 121. Aust makes a similar 
point: see A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice  (2000), p. 190. 
15 It is assumed that the word “real” in Article 6(1) qualifies “change of registry” as well as “”transfer of 
ownership”, otherwise the provision about registry would seem to be a tautology as a vessel cannot normally 
change its flag without a change of registry, and vice versa. In the French text, however, “real” qualifies only 
“transfer of ownership”. On the other hand, in the Spanish text “real” seems to qualify both “transfer of 
ownership” and “change of registry” (“excepto como resultado de un cambio efectivo de la propriedad o en el 
registro”).   
16 Sinclair, op. cit. in n. 14, p. 137. So, too, Aust, who says that practice must be consistent and common to, or 
accepted by (even if only tacitly), all the parties to the treaty: op. cit. in n. 14, pp. 194-5. 
17 Op. cit. in n. 6, paras 63 and 73-75.  
18 It should be noted that of the 62 parties to the High Seas Convention, there are nine landlocked States without a 
merchant navy of any kind. 
19 K. X. Li and J. Wonham, “New Developments in Ship Registration”, (1999) 14 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 137. 
 14
intermediate between closed and open registers).  Of the parties to the High Seas 
Convention, two (Cambodia and Cyprus) are open registers; fifteen (Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, Finland, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Poland, Russia, Senegal, Switzerland, Thailand and the USA) are closed registers; six States 
(Australia, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK) are compromise registers; and no 
information is given in the study on the remaining 30 States parties to the Convention.  Of 
the fifteen States having closed registers, there is considerable diversity of practice in relation 
to, for example, the percentage of equity capital required to be held by nationals, the 
nationality of directors of companies and the nationality requirements for officers and crews.  
Differences in practice are further accentuated by the fact that some parties to the 
Convention  (Denmark, Germnay, Italy) have a second, international register in addition to 
their original register, while other parties (Netherlands, United Kingdom) have separate 
registers in their dependent territories. In view of this considerable diversity of practice, it 
seems impossible to say that it constitutes “subsequent practice” within the meaning of 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties because the necessary 
degree of concordance, as noted by Sinclair and the International Court of Justice in the 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, is simply lacking.  
 
Finally, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires an examination of the object and 
purpose of the High Seas Convention.  The Convention itself contains  no statement as to its 
object and purpose.  It is reasonable to assume, however, that a principal object and 
purpose of the Convention is to provide for a system of regulation and order on the high 
seas. This would therefore suggest that a flag State ought to be able to control its ships on 
the high seas to ensure that they act in an orderly way and that they comply with any 
international regulations binding on the flag State. This is especially necessary as ships on the 
high seas are in principle subject only to the jurisdiction (legislative and enforcement) of their 
flag States.  Apart from a handful of exceptions, such as piracy, no State may exercise 
jurisdiction on the high seas over a ship having the nationality of another State.  This 
therefore suggests that the link between a flag State and its ships should be of such a 
character as to allow it to be able to exercise the necessary control and jurisdiction to 
maintain order on the high seas. 
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In employing Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, no completely certain or unambiguous 
meaning of the term “genuine link”  emerges.  The ordinary meaning of the text of Article 
5(1) of the High Seas Convention, taken together with its context and the object and 
purpose of the Convention, suggest that nationality is not a status casually to be bestowed 
upon a ship, that the link between a ship and the State purporting to confer its nationality 
upon that ship must be a real and not an artificial or tenuous one, and that a State must be 
able to exercise effective control and jurisdiction over ships to which it has granted its 
nationality. But exactly what is required to constitute a real or “genuine” link is not entirely 
clear.  In view of this uncertainty, it is therefore permissible, and indeed necessary, to invoke 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention and employ supplementary means of interpretation, 
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. 
 
Turning to the second question to be looked at in this study, namely the consequences that 
follow where there is no “genuine link”, the High Seas Convention contains no provisions 
dealing directly with this issue nor does it implicitly suggest an answer to the question. Here 
neither the context nor the object and purpose of the Convention appear to shed any light on 
the matter. It is therefore necessary, perhaps even more so than in the case of the meaning 
of the term “genuine link”, to have recourse to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention and 
consider the materials referred to there, to which accordingly we now turn.  
 
 
3.3 Travaux Préparatoires 
As mentioned above, the Convention on the High Seas was adopted at the First United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held in 1958.  The Conference had before it a 
set of draft articles prepared by the International Law Commission, a body of independent 
legal experts appointed by the UN for the codification and progressive development of 
international law.  The preparatory work of the Convention thus includes both the work of 
the International Law Commission and the proceedings at the 1958 Conference.  The work 
of the International Law Commission will be looked at first. 
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3.3.1 The Work of the International Law Commission 
 
The International Law Commission dealt with the law of the sea at its sessions held between 
1950 and 1956.  The question of the conditions for granting nationality to ships appeared at 
an early stage in the Commission’s work.  At the 1951 session the Special Rapporteur on 
the Law of the Sea, Mr François, emphasised that if there was no real connection between 
the flag State and the crew and ownership of the vessel, it would be difficult for the flag 
State to regulate the vessel properly.  He also referred to the work of the Institute of 
International Law, which in 1896 had suggested that, in order to acquire the right to fly the 
flag of a State, more than half of the ship must be owned by nationals or a national company 
of the State concerned.20  There was considerable support in the Commission for the 
Rapporteur’s views and at the end of the 1951 session agreement was reached on a text 
under which a State could fix the conditions on which it would permit a ship to be registered 
in its territory and to fly its flag, “yet the general practice of States has established minimum 
requirements which must be met if the national character of the ship is to be recognised by 
other States.”  These minimum requirements were that the vessel must either be fifty per cent 
owned by nationals of the flag State, or be owned by a company in which more than half the 
shareholders were nationals or domiciled in the flag State, or be owned by a company 
registered in the flag State and having its head office there.21  This proposal was further 
discussed and minor amendments made at the following sessions of the Commission.  In 
1955 the Commission produced a set of draft articles on the High Seas.22  Article 5 of this 
draft read as follows: 
 
Each State may fix the conditions for the registration of ships in its territory and the right to fly its flag. 
Nevertheless, for purposes of recognition of its national character by other States, a ship must either: 
1. Be the property of the State concerned; or 
2. Be more than half owned by: 
(a) Nationals of or persons legally domiciled in the territory of the State concerned and actually resident 
there; or 
                                                             
20 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1951, Vol. II, pp. 75-76. 
21 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 330-4. 
22 Ibid., 1955, Vol. II, p. 20. 
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(b) A partnership in which the majority of the partners with personal liability are nationals of or persons 
legally domiciled in the territory of the State concerned and actually resident there; or 
(c) A joint stock company formed under the laws of the State concerned and having its registered office in 
the territory of that State.  
 
In its comments on draft article 5 the Commission noted: 
 
 Each State lays down the conditions on which sea-going ships may fly its flag. Obviously the  State 
enjoys complete liberty in the case of ships owned by it or ships which are the property  of a nationalized 
company.  With regard to other ships, the State must accept certain  restrictions.  As in the case of the granting of 
nationality to persons, national legislation on the  subject must not diverge too far from the principles adopted by 
the majority of States, which  may be regarded as forming part of international law.  Only on that condition will the 
 freedom granted to States not give rise to abuse and to friction with other States.  With regard  to 
the national element required for permission to fly the flag, a great many systems are  possible; but there must 
be a minimum national element, since control and jurisdiction by a  State over ships flying its flag can only be 
effectively exercised where there is in fact a  relationship between the State and the ship other than that based 
on mere registration.23 
 
The Commission also expressed the opinion that the principle contained in the draft article, 
which it said was found in the national legislation of the great majority of States, “should be 
regarded as forming part of existing international law” (by which the Commission 
presumably meant customary international law).  The Commission added that “if the 
practical ends in view are to be achieved, States must work out more detailed provisions 
when they incorporate the above rules in their legislation.”  The Commission had also 
considered the possibility of requiring the master and a proportion of the crew to be 
nationals of the flag State, but rejected this idea on the ground that certain States had 
insufficient trained personnel to enable them to comply with such a requirement.24   
 
This draft article, along with the other draft articles, was circulated to States for comment.  
Most States were supportive of the Commission’s proposals.  Of particular interest are the 
responses of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  The Netherlands proposed that 
“for purposes of recognition of the national character of the ship by other States, there must 
                                                             
23 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
 18
exist a genuine connection between the State and the ship.”  The Netherlands doubted 
whether it was possible to lay down detailed regulations concerning the right of States to 
grant their nationality to ships, and proposed that merely the principle of the requirement of a 
genuine connection be stated.25  The United Kingdom proposed that in order to have the 
nationality of the flag State and be recognised as such, the flag State must effectively 
exercise jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag. 26   
 
In 1956 the Commission produced its final set of draft articles,27 which were those before 
delegates at the 1958 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.  Article 29(1) of these articles 
read as follows: 
 
 Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration  of 
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.  Ships have the nationality of the State  whose flag 
they are entitled to fly.   Nevertheless, for purposes of recognition of the national  character of the ship by 
other States, there must exist a genuine link between the State and the  ship. 
 
The Commission’s commentary on this draft article began, as its commentary in 1955 had 
done, by emphasising the need for certain restrictions on the liberty of States to grant their 
nationality to vessels.  The Commission then went on to explain why, unlike in its 1955 draft, 
it had decided to omit detailed criteria for the nationality of ships. 
 
At its eighth session, the Commission, after examining the comments of Governments, felt obliged to abandon 
this viewpoint.  It came to the conclusion that the criteria it had formulated could not fulfil the aim it had set 
itself.  Existing practice in the various States is too divergent to be governed by the few criteria adopted by the 
Commission.  Regulations of this kind would be bound to leave a large number of problems unsolved and could 
not prevent abuse.  The Commission accordingly thought it best to confine itself to enunciating the guiding 
principle that, before the grant of nationality is generally recognized, there must be a genuine link between the 
ship and the State granting permission to fly its flag.  The Commission does not consider it possible to state in 
any greater detail what form this link should take.  This lack of precision made some members of the 
Commission question the advisability of inserting such a stipulation.  But the majority of the Commission 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 Ibid., p. 23. 
25 Ibid., 1956, Vol. II, pp. 52-3. 
26 Ibid., p. 81. 
27 Ibid., p. 256. 
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preferred a vague criterion to no criterion at all.  While leaving States a wide latitude in this respect, the 
Commission wished to make it clear that the grant of its flag to a ship cannot be a mere administrative 
formality, with no accompanying guarantee that the ship possess a real link with its new State.  The 
jurisdiction of the State over ships, and the control it should exercise in conformity with article 34 of these 
articles, can only be effective where there exists in fact a relationship between the State and ship other than 
mere registration or the mere grant of a certificate of registry.28 
 
3.3.2 Proceedings at the UN Conference of the Law of the Sea, 1958 
 
At the Conference a wide range of views was expressed concerning the International Law 
Commission’s draft article 29.  Views ranged from those States (predominantly traditional 
maritime States such as Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) 
which thought that the genuine link was an essential requirement and should be developed in 
detail at the Conference through to States which thought that the requirement of a genuine 
link was unnecessary, inappropriate or too vague.  The latter group of States included 
Brazil, Greece, Guatemala, India, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay and the 
USA.  The majority of States, however, were in favour of the genuine link requirement, at 
least as a broad statement of principle.  A number of States, such as Australia, 
Czechoslovakia, Portugal and the United Kingdom, thought that further development and 
elaboration of the concept was necessary and should be done on some subsequent occasion 
in a different forum.  Those supporting the genuine link stressed the importance of the 
requirement for the control and maintenance of public order on the high seas.  However, 
there was no real consensus as to what the criteria for a genuine link should be, although 
many States stressed that an essential element was effective jurisdiction and control by the 
flag State.   
 
In comparison with the International Law Commission’s draft article 29, Article 5 of the 
High Seas Convention, as adopted by the Conference, has two major changes.  The first of 
these is that the phrase, “for the purposes of recognition of the national character of the 
                                                             
28 Ibid., p. 279. 
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ship,” was deleted.  This phrase had attracted criticism, inter alia, from Liberia, Panama, 
the USA and West Germany, because of its uncertainty and the consequences of non-
recognition.  It seemed anomalous to these and other States to allow on the one hand a 
State to determine the conditions under which it would grant its nationality to a ship, and 
then, on the other hand, to allow other States to refuse to recognise that nationality on the 
ground of the lack of a genuine link.  This was all the more problematic because there was 
no agreement as to what constituted a genuine link.  It was argued that this would lead to 
international friction and disputes, and there would be difficulties over the position vis à vis a 
ship which was deemed not to have a genuine link with the flag State and the State refusing 
recognition.  Furthermore, the consequences of non-recognition were unclear - would this 
give third States the right to board a vessel?  Was the vessel to be regarded as stateless?  In 
spite of these criticisms, the phrase, “for the purposes of recognition of the national 
character of the ship”, was retained in committee, a proposal by Liberia to delete the phrase 
being defeated by 39 votes to 13 with six abstentions.29 In the plenary session of the 
Conference, however, a renewed attempt to delete the phrase was successful, being 
adopted by 30 votes to 15 with 17 abstentions.30  
  
The second change made at the 1958 Conference was to add, after “genuine link”, the 
words, “in particular, the State must exercise effective jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.”  This change was made 
on a proposal by Italy (supplemented by a proposal by France) and received wide support 
both amongst the advocates of a genuine link, such as the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, and amongst traditional flag of convenience countries such as Liberia.31 
However, there was disagreement as to whether the requirement of the effective exercise of 
jurisdiction and control by the flag State was an indispensable, if not necessarily the only, 
element of the genuine link (the view of the traditional maritime States), or whether the 
requirement was independent of  the genuine link (the view of flag of convenience States). 
 
                                                             
29 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. IV, p. 75.  
30 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 20. 
31 The proposal was adopted in committee by 34 votes to 4 with 17 abstentions: ibid., Vol. IV, p. 75.  
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Article 29 of the International Law Commission’s draft, as amended in the ways described 
above, was adopted unanimously in the plenary session of the Conference, to become 
Article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas. 
 
3.4 Decisions of Courts 
 
This section looks at decisions of courts to see if they shed any light on the questions with 
which this study is concerned.  The courts whose decisions will be examined are the 
International Court of Justice and the European Court of Justice.  No attempt has been 
made to search for decisions of national courts on this question as rulings of national courts 
on questions of international law are generally regarded as not being very authoritative.   
3.4.1 The International Court of Justice 
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has dealt with three cases which have some 
relevance to the question of the nationality of ships.  These are the Nottebohm , IMCO and 
Barcelona Traction cases.  Each will be looked at in turn. 
3,4.1.1 The Nottebohm Case32 
 
This case concerned the question of whether Liechtenstein could exercise diplomatic 
protection on behalf of one of its nationals, Mr Nottebohm, in respect of certain acts 
committed by Guatemala against him which were alleged to be breaches of international law.  
Nottebohm had been born in Germany in 1881.  He possessed German nationality, but from 
1905 had spent much of his life in Guatemala which he had made the headquarters of his 
business activities.  He obtained Liechtenstein nationality through naturalisation in 1939.  His 
connections with that country were slight, being limited to a few visits to a brother who lived 
there.  At the outset the Court made it clear that it was not concerned with the law of 
                                                             
32 [1955] ICJ Rep. 4. 
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nationality in general, but only with the question of whether Liechtenstein could exercise 
diplomatic protection in respect of Nottebohm vis à vis Guatemala.  The Court noted that 
while under international law it was up to each State to lay down rules governing the grant of 
its nationality, a State could not claim that: 
 
the rules it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by another state unless it has acted in conformity with 
this general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual’s genuine connection with the 
State which assumes the defence of its citizens by means of protection as against other States.33 
 
The Court went on to add: 
 
nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, 
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.  It may be said to 
constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred...is in fact more 
closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.  
Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis à vis another State, if it constitutes a 
translation into juridical terms of the individual’s connection with the State which has made him his national.34 
 
The Court found on the facts that there was insufficient connection between Nottebohm and 
Liechtenstein for the latter to be able to exercise diplomatic protection on Nottebohm’s 
behalf vis à vis Guatemala. 
 
There is no doubt that the International Court’s judgement in the Nottebohm case, given in 
1955 when the International Law Commission was nearing the conclusion of its deliberations 
on the law of the sea, had some influence on both the Commission and on States in their 
responses to the Commission’s 1955 draft articles and at the 1958 Conference itself.  There 
seems little doubt that the use of the word “genuine” in the phrase “genuine link” derives 
from the use of that word by the International Court in the Nottebohm  case.  However, the 
                                                             
33 Ibid., p. 23. 
34 Ibid. 
 23
case seems of very limited significance in terms of trying to understand what is meant by a 
“genuine link” in the context of the nationality of ships.  This is both because of the limited 
issue which the Court was deciding (diplomatic protection) and because the kind of factors 
which the Court mentioned in the Nottebohm  case as establishing a genuine connection 
between an individual and a State granting its nationality - such as habitual residence in the 
State concerned, business interests there, general ties of sentiment to that State, family ties 
and so on35 - are largely irrelevant and inapplicable to relations between a ship and a State.  
Thus, while it seems that the Nottebohm  case is of some historical significance in terms of its 
influence on the provisions concerning the nationality of ships in the High Seas Convention, it 
does not really throw any light on the meaning of the phrase, “genuine link”,  in that 
Convention.   
 
3.4.1.2 The IMCO Case36 
 
In this case the ICJ was asked for an advisory opinion on the question of whether the 
Maritime Safety Committee had been constituted in accordance with Article 28 of the 
Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (as the 
International Maritime Organisation was then known).  This article provides that the 
Committee shall “consist of fourteen members...of which not less than eight shall be the 
largest ship -owning nations...” Liberia and Panama, at that time having the third and eighth 
largest shipping tonnages registered under their flags, were not selected in this category.  The 
Court held, by nine votes to five, that the Committee had not been validly constituted in 
accordance with Article 28.  The Court stated that the phrase, “largest ship -owning 
nations”, should be read in its ordinary and natural meaning.  “Largest” meant the largest 
tonnage: this was the only practicable form of measurement.  “Ship-owning” could mean 
either owned by nationals of the States concerned or the registered tonnage of the States 
concerned regardless of beneficial ownership.  The latter was the correct meaning: it 
                                                             
35 Ibid., p. 22. 
36 Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organisation [1960] ICJ Rep. 150. 
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followed from other articles of the Convention and their interpretation by members of 
IMCO.  It was also a much more practicable test than the test of beneficial ownership by 
nationals.  Other conventions also used this test.  The concept of the “genuine link” was 
irrelevant for deciding the issue.  
 
Although the Court’s judgement is open to criticism on various grounds,37 one can 
understand why the Court was reluctant to get involved in any discussion of the “genuine 
link” requirement for nationality and its application to flags of convenience.  The Court’s 
judgement therefore throws no light on the meaning of the phrase “genuine link.”  Only one 
of the dissenting judges, Judge Moreno Quintana, discusses the issue and then only briefly. 
In relation to the phrase “largest shipowning nations”, he observes:  
 
The registration of shipping by an administrative authority is one thing, the ownership of a merchant fleet is 
another.  The latter reflects an international economic reality which can be satisfactorily established only by the 
existence of a genuine link between the owner of a ship and the flag it flies.  This is the doctrine expressed by 
Article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas which...constitutes at the present time the opinio ju ris gentium 
on the matter.38 
 
He goes on to add: 
 
A merchant fleet is not an artificial creation. It is a reality which corresponds to certain indispensable 
requirements of a national economy. . . The flag - that supreme emblem of sovereignty which international law 
authorises a ship to fly - must represent a country’s degree of economic independence, not the  interests of 
third parties or companies.39 
 
A number of States which intervened in the case referred in some detail to the “genuine link” 
requirement and it is of interest to note their comments briefly here.  The Netherlands 
                                                             
37 See, for example, K. R. Simmonds, “The Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO”, (1963) 12 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 56 at 83-7. 
38 Ibid., p. 178. 
39 Ibid. 
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pointed out that it was clear from the discussions at the 1958 Conference that there was a 
consensus that mere registration was not sufficient to establish a genuine link between a ship 
and a State.  It argued that the genuine link requirement in Article 5 of the High Seas 
Convention was codificatory of the rules of international law and clearly imposed limitations 
on the freedom of a State to determine which ships belonged to that State.  The Netherlands 
concluded that there was no genuine link between Liberia and Panama and the ships 
registered by them because the legislation of those countries had no provisions on 
incorporation of ship-owning companies or the nationality of the management, which were 
common connecting factors in other States.40  Norway expressed the view that Article 5 
represented established principles of international law, since States could not fulfil their 
international obligations in respect of ships flying their flag unless there existed a genuine link 
and, in particular, effective jurisdiction and control.  As to the contents of a genuine link, 
Norway made the following observations:   
 
The International Law Commission decided in the end that ‘existing practice in the various States is too 
divergent to be governed by the few criteria adopted by the Commission’ and it also said that these few criteria 
‘could not prevent abuse’ . . . that was why the Commission decided to adopt one general formula. It 
wanted to include more. There is thus . . . no basis for asserting . . . that it follows from the successive drafts 
of the International Law Commission that a number of the most important criteria must be left out in the 
application of the ‘genuine link’ . . .  
As for the interpretation of the formula [of the ‘genuine link’], it was submitted at the conference, by those 
who supported it, that effective jurisdiction and control were indispensable elements of the genuine link, 
and that this should, therefore, be added to the text proposed by the Commission, and that was done.  
Otherwise, it was pointed out that there must be many other links between a ship and the State whose flag it 
flies . . . but it was emphasised that one could not point out any one of these elements as indispensable.  It was 
the aggregate of these links which, together with the effective jurisdiction and control, constituted the genuine 
link and it was very difficult to single out certain criteria as necessary and others as insignificant in this respect.  
It was the sum total which mattered . . . 
                                                             
40 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, Pleadings, Oral Arguments and Documents, pp. 
251-2 and 357. 
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There is thus no basis for claiming that the contents of the ‘genuine link’ consist of, or preclude, any particular 
criteria, except that effective jurisdiction and control, which were added to the text of the International Law 
Commission, are a condition sine qua non .41  
 
On the other side, Liberia, which did not consider that the question of the genuine link was 
relevant to the case, denied that the principle of the genuine link was established in 
international law and asserted that it was not part of customary international law.  But even if 
it were, the principle was not intended to refer to the concept of beneficial ownership, i.e. 
there was no requirement that for a genuine link to exist, beneficial ownership of the ship had 
to be vested in nationals of the flag State.42  Furthermore, the fact that the 1958 Conference 
deleted the phrase beginning “nevertheless, for the purposes of recognition”, meant that 
other States were not entitled to question the nationality conferred on ships by a State.43 
 
3.4.1.3 The Barcelona Traction Case44 
 
A central issue in this case concerned the nationality of companies.  While understandably 
the International Court did not refer in its judgement to the question of the nationality of 
ships, some reference to this was made by Judge Jessup in his separate opinion.  He argued 
that the concept of genuine link was common to the nationality of people, ships and 
companies, and that in each of these cases other States were not bound to recognise the 
grant of nationality where no genuine link existed. 
 
If a State purports to confer its nationality on ships by allowing them to fly its flag, without assuring that they 
meet such tests as management, ownership, jurisdiction and control, other St ates are not bound to recognise the 
asserted nationality of the ship.45 
 
                                                             
41 Ibid., pp. 367-8 (emphasis in the original). 
42 Ibid., p. 298. 
43 Ibid., p. 404. 
44 [1970] ICJ Rep. 1. 
45 Ibid., p.188. 
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Although only the views of an individual judge, and therefore of limited authority, Judge 
Jessup’s opinion is of considerable interest not only because he tends to support the views 
of the Norwegian government in its pleadings in the IMCO case that the genuine link may 
involve a number of possible criteria, but also because it is one of the few pronouncements 
made by anyone other than an academic writer since 1958 about the consequences that may 
follow in the absence of a genuine link.   
 
3.4.2 The European Court of Justice 
 
The question of the genuine link has arisen in a number of cases before the European Court.  
Most notably it arose in the Factortame cases.  The background to these cases was that in 
the 1980s Spanish fishing vessel owners began to take advantage of the United Kingdom’s 
liberal rules on registration of vessels.  These allowed foreign nationals to set up companies 
in the United Kingdom and then to acquire vessels which could fly the British flag.  Spanish 
fishing concerns thus set up companies which acquired fishing vessels which flew the British 
flag. These vessels then fished against the United Kingdom’s quotas.  The purpose of this 
was to give what were in reality Spanish fishing vessels larger quotas than they would have 
obtained otherwise, since under the Common Fisheries Policy Spain is given very limited 
quotas in Community waters. This practice was known as “quota hopping.”  One of the 
United Kingdom’s responses to this development was to enact the Merchant Shipping Act 
1988.  The Act provided that to qualify as a British fishing vessel (and thus be eligible to fish 
for quotas allocated to the United Kingdom) a fishing vessel had to be British owned, 
meaning that if it was owned by a company, that company’s principal place of business had 
to be in the United Kingdom and at least 75 per cent of its shares owned by, and at least 75 
per cent of its directors be, British citizens resident and domiciled in the United Kingdom.  
The vessel also had to be managed and its operations directed and controlled from within 
the United Kingdom.  The Act was challenged for its compatibility with Community law both 
by Spanish fishing companies before British courts (which referred the matter to the 
European Court for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the relevant Community law) 
and by the EC Commission directly before the European Court in an Article 169 action. The 
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European Court gave parallel judgements in the two cases.46  Factortame and the 
Commission argued that the British legislation was contrary to Community law rules on non-
discrimination and freedom of establishment.  One of the arguments raised by the British 
government in defence of the Act was that the Act was required in order to comply with the 
genuine link requirement in Article 5 of the High Seas Convention, and this therefore justified 
the Act in not complying with Community law. The Court dealt with this argument very 
briefly, simply observing: 
 
That argument might have some merit only if the requirements laid down by Community law with regard to the 
exercise by the Member States of the powers which they retain with regard to the registration of vessels 
conflicted with the rules of international law.47 
 
The Court’s observation is scarcely an adequate rebuttal of a complex argument, and 
certainly sheds no light on the meaning of the genuine link requirement.  A fuller and more 
satisfactory rebuttal of the British government’s argument was given by Advocate General 
Mischo in his opinion.  He noted that: 
 
In so far as compliance with the rules of the Treaty in relations between the Member States does not jeopardise 
non-member countries’ rights under the 1958 Geneva Convention, the United Kingdom cannot rely on that 
Convention in order to justify infringements of those rules.   
 
The Advocate General also came to the conclusion that whilst the criterion of the owner’s 
nationality was consistent with a fairly widespread international practice, it was not part of 
customary international law.   
 
No provision of the 1958 Geneva Convention obliges it [i.e. the United Kingdom] to have recourse to particular 
conditions in order to ensure that there is a ‘genuine link’ between it and the ships to which it intends to grant 
flag rights.  Consequently, even if a non-member country may possibly be entitled not to recognise a flag 
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granted in a manner contrary to the Geneva Convention, it can do so only insofar as there is no ‘genuine link’, 
regardless as to its nature, between the vessel and the State whose flag it is flying. 
 
The Advocate General went on to point out that given that the requirements about the 
nationality of shareholders and directors etc. were applicable only to fishing vessels and not 
to other British vessels, this showed that the British government did not regard such 
requirements as suitable for ensuring the existence of a genuine link.48  Thus, the Advocate 
General suggests that criteria relating to beneficial ownership are not necessarily essential to 
ensuring a genuine link.  Interestingly, he also suggests that other States might be entitled not 
to recognise the nationality of a vessel in respect of which there was no genuine link between 
it and its flag State.   
 
The Court has maintained the position that it took in Factortame in a number of subsequent 
cases.49   It is also of interest to note Advocate General Tesauro’s opinion in one of these 
cases, Commission v. Hellenic Republic .  In response to a similar argument to that raised 
by the United Kingdom in the Factortame case, the Advocate General stated: 
 
Article 5 of the Geneva Convention cannot be interpreted as a rule requiring a genuine link between a State and 
a ship to be in a particular form as a necessary precondition for the grant of nationality.  Apart from the fact, 
not to be overlooked, that it is precisely the definitive version [i.e. Article 5 as opposed to the International 
Law Commission draft article] which refutes the idea of making the grant of nationality in respect of a ship 
dependent on the ship’s being owned preponderantly by citizens of the flag State, it must be said that the 
aforesaid provision is silent as to the preconditions for the existence of a ‘genuine link’, so that it comes to 
mean effective control and jurisdiction which the State is bound to exercise over ships to which it has 
irrevocably granted its nationality.  If anything, then, far from being a condition for the grant of nationality, the 
‘genuine link’ amounts primarily to a duty of supervision resulting from the grant of nationality.  It is 
consistent with this interpretation of a ‘genuine link’ to require that the place where the vessel is managed, 
directed and controlled should be in the territory of the flag State.50 
                                                                                                                                                                             
47 Para. 16 of the judgement in Case C-221/89; para. 14 of the judgement in Case C-246/89. 
48 Paragraph 15 of the Advocate General’s opinion. 
49 See Case C-334/94, Commission v. France [1996] ECR I-1307; Case C-151/96, Commission v. Ireland 
[1997] ECR I-3327; and Case C-62/96, Commission v. Hellenic Republic [1997] ECR I-6725. 
50 Para. 13 of his opinion. 
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The European Court has also considered the question of whether a ship apparently not 
having a genuine link with the State of which it has the nationality must nevertheless be 
regarded as having that nationality.  This issue arose in Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen 
and Diva Navigation.51 This case concerned a Panamanian-registered vessel which was 
both beneficially owned and crewed by Danish nationals.  The vessel was arrested and 
prosecuted when it put into a Danish port with a cargo of salmon on board which had 
allegedly been caught in contravention of an EC regulation.  The case was referred to the 
European Court by the Danish court for a preliminary ruling.  One of the questions the 
European Court was asked was whether a vessel registered in a non-EC Member State 
could be treated, for the purposes of the EC regulation, as a vessel with a nationality of a 
Member State on the grounds that there was a genuine link between that vessel and that 
Member State.  To this question the European Court replied: 
 
Under international law a vessel in principle has only one nationality, that of the State in which it is registered 
(see in particular articles 5 and 6 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas . . .). 
It follows that a Member State may not treat a vessel which is already registered in a non-Member country and 
therefore has the nationality of that country as a vessel flying the flag of that Member State. 
The fact that the sole link between a vessel and the State of which it holds the nationality is the administrative 
formality of registration cannot prevent the application of that rule.  It was for the State that conferred its 
nationality in the first place to determine at its absolute discretion the conditions on which it would grant its 
nationality (see in particular article 5 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas . . .).52 
 
The European Court here takes an extreme position, apparently suggesting both that 
administrative formalities alone are sufficient and that there are no other criteria required for 
the grant of nationality (and therefore that nothing further is required to establish a genuine 
link). The Court also appears to deny the possibility that other States could ever refuse to 
recognise the grant of nationality to a vessel by a particular State, however flimsy the 
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connections between the vessel and that State might be.  The Court’s view was also shared 
by Advocate General Tesauro. 
 
The Court repeated what it said in the Poulsen case in a case decided two days later, 
Commission v. Ireland.53  In this case Ireland had sought to justify regulations which 
prohibited what were effectively Spanish-owned British vessels from fishing in its waters or 
landing fish in its ports on the ground that under international law it was authorised to decline 
to recognise the nationality of vessels which did not have a genuine link with the State whose 
flag they flew.   
 
Finally, it is of interest to consider the Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in the earliest of 
the cases considered here, R v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fish, Fisheries and Food ex p. 
Jaderow.54  This case, like the Factortame case, was concerned with the so-called quota-
hopping activities of Spanish fishermen.  In this case the United Kingdom had issued licences 
to Spanish beneficially-owned British vessels including a condition that such vessels must 
operate from British ports.  This condition had been challenged by Jaderow as being 
incompatible with Community law.  The Advocate General rejected such an argument and 
noted that the right of a Member State to require its fishing vessels to operate from its ports 
could not, in particular, be called into question if one considered the provisions of Articles 5 
and 10 of the High Seas Convention. “It appears from those provisions that a Member 
State may not be criticised for considering that it would be unable to carry out the 
prescribed verifications if each vessel was not periodically present in one of its ports.”55  In 
other words, the Advocate General is saying that in order for a flag State to be able to 
exercise its jurisdiction effectively, it is entitled to require its vessels to operate from its ports.  
The Advocate General also took the view that the United Kingdom was entitled to consider 
that Jaderow’s domiciliation of its vessels in the United Kingdom and its payment of taxes in 
the United Kingdom were insufficient to constitute a genuine link. 
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It appears simply from reading Article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas that the Member State in question 
[i.e. the United Kingdom] cannot be criticised for taking the view that those factors alone do not enable it 
effectively to exercise its jurisdiction and supervision in technical, administrative and social matters over 
vessels flying its flag.   
It must not be forgotten in this regard that the countries which offer so-called flags of convenience also require 
companies owning vessels registered with them to have their registered office in their own country and to pay 
the taxes laid down by the law.56    
 
The Advocate General here seems to be coming very close to saying that a flag of 
convenience State whose only connection with a vessel is the fact that the company owning 
that vessel has a registered office in its territory does not have a genuine link with that vessel. 
 
Summing up this case law, a rather mixed picture emerges. The European Court appears to 
take the view that registration alone is sufficient to establish nationality and that nothing 
further is required to constitute a genuine link. Furthermore, other States may not question 
the nationality of a vessel, no matter how tenuous the links between it and its flag State. 
Advocate General Tesauro sees the genuine link less as a condition of nationality and more 
as laying down an obligation on the flag State to exercise effective jurisdiction and control 
over its ships. On the other hand, Advocate General Mischo not only sees the existence of a 
genuine link as an essential condition for the grant of nationality but also takes the view that 
this entitles the flag State to lay down a variety of conditions to ensure that it is in a position 
to exercise effective jurisdiction and control, although there is no particular condition that is 
required by international law. He also appears to suggest that other States may refuse to 
recognise the nationality of a ship where there is no genuine link between it and the flag 
State.  
 
It may be asked what authority these judgements of the European Court and opinions of the 
Advocates General have.  Clearly, the European Court is authoritative in its pronouncements 
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on European Community law.  It is less authoritative in its pronouncements on public 
international law - clearly it is less authoritative than the International Court of Justice or 
other international courts, which deal constantly with public international law.  At the same 
time the European Court’s pronouncements would appear to have more authority than those 
of national courts.  Overall, it is probably fair to say that the European Court’s treatment of 
international law in its case law has been somewhat mixed.  Certainly there have been 
occasions on which its treatment of the law has not been very cogent and its rulings have 
received criticism from academic commentators.  There has been something of a tendency 
for the European Court to adopt a view of international law which best suits its conception 
of Community law: this can be seen, for example, in the Factortame case referred to 
above.  The collegiate nature of the Court’s judgement whereby the Court gives a single 
judgement representing the views of all members of the Court, with no separate or dissenting 
opinions, often leads to its judgements being terse and laconic, and without a full 
development of the argument: again this can be seen in the Factortame case.  The 
Advocate General’s opinions, on the other hand, are usually much more fully argued and 
often more cogent, although obviously considerably less authoritative than the Court’s 
judgements.   
 
3.5 The Views of Writers 
 
Before attempting to draw some conclusions on the basis of the materials which have been 
examined above, it is desirable briefly to survey the views of writers on the issues under 
consideration.  The question of the meaning of the “genuine link” and the consequences 
which follow from the absence of such a link have been the subject of a considerable 
literature.  For reasons of space, only a selection of authors on this subject can be examined 
here, and then, because of linguistic limitations, only those authors writing in English or 
French.   
 
The views of writers on the meaning of the genuine link vary enormously.  At one extreme, 
there is the policy-orientated New Haven school of jurisprudence, exemplified by 
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McDougal and his associates57 and Boczek58, which is opposed to a genuine link 
requirement and favours a policy of liberalisation as far as shipping is concerned.  These 
writers attack the lack of clarity of definition of the genuine link: in the words of McDougal 
and Burke, it is “the most ambiguous criterion ever devised for identifying the national 
character of a ship.”59  These writers also criticise the fact that it is not clear whether Article 
5 lays down two tests - the genuine link plus the effective exercise of jurisdiction - or 
whether there is one test, which is the effective exercise of jurisdiction.  The lack of clarity as 
to the consequences that follow where there is no genuine link is also the subject of 
sustained criticism, and it is argued that insistence on such a link will lead to increasing 
numbers of stateless ships and to frequent searches of ships flying a flag suspected of not 
being bound by a genuine link: such developments would put in jeopardy the entire world’s 
shipping industry.  Much is made, too, of the fact that the genuine link is capable of impeding 
competition in the shipping industry, and that the general community interest is best served 
by as few restraints on competition as possible.  They argue that the only test of nationality 
should be registration of the vessel concerned in the flag State; and that once the vessel has 
been registered, other States are bound to accept the nationality thus conferred.  Boczek 
therefore concludes that “the genuine link clause of art. 5 must be interpreted as a general 
rule laying down, in the interests of safety and order of navigation, the duty of the flag State 
to control effectively on the high seas the ships flying its flag.”60 
 
Other writers, less overtly influenced by policy considerations, have been critical of the 
genuine link concept.  O’Connell, for example, concludes that the concept is impossible to 
apply because no explicit connection can be established between a State and the shipowner 
where that owner is a company. 61  McConnell draws particular attention to the lack of 
clarity concerning the phrase relating to effective jurisdiction and control, and states that the 
relationship between the genuine link, jurisdiction and control and registration remains 
                                                             
57 M. S. McDougal and W. T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (1962), Chapter 8; and M. S. McDougal, 
W. T. Burke and I. A. Vlasic, “The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the Nationalit y of Ships”, (1960) 54 
American Journal of International Law  25. 
58 B. Boczek, Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study  (1962).  See especially chapter IX. 
59 McDougal and Burke, op. cit., p. 1122. 
60 Op. cit., p. 283. 
61 D. P. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea , Vol. II (1984), p. 760. 
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unclear.  She asks: “Is effective control proof of genuine link, a consequence of it, or a 
condition precedent to registration?”  She goes on to ask whether effective jurisdiction and 
control is constituted by the mere fact of registration of the ship with the flag State, or 
whether something more is required, and if so, what.62  Wefers Bettink concentrates on 
what he regards as the ineffectiveness of the genuine link requirement, arguing that as there is 
no sanction for its absence, States can in practice implement the requirement as they wish.63  
Other authors who are particularly critical of the drafting of Article 5 include Johnson. 64 
 
A third group of writers are less critical of the drafting and even somewhat supportive of 
Article 5.  Dupuy and Vignes, after pointing out that the 1958 Conference chose not to 
define a genuine link, conclude that Article 5 leaves it to each State to determine what 
constitutes a genuine link.  The genuine link is a means to achieving the end of effective 
exercise of flag State jurisdiction.  They also conclude that as the 1958 Conference deleted 
the International Law Commission’s provisions concerning non-recognition, no State has the 
right to criticise the conditions laid down by other States for the grant of nationality or the 
right not to recognise that nationality.65  In somewhat similar vein Tache argues that the 
insertion of the phrase beginning “in particular” in Article 5(1) injected a dichotomy into the 
meaning of the “genuine link”, namely “legal and functional. Legally, all that is required of a 
flagstate [sic] to establish genuine link is the conferment of national character upon a ship. 
However, the flagstate has a secondary duty, functional in nature, to effectively exercise 
jurisdictional control over the internal affairs of the ship.”  He goes on to add that the 
requirement of the effective exercise of jurisdiction is not “a precondition for the recognition 
of nationality”, it is “an impled duty accepted by the flagstate vis à vis the international 
community.”66  Anderson, on the other hand, takes a very limited view of the genuine link 
requirement; and, relying on the Nottebohm case, states simply that once a ship has been 
registered, a genuine link has been established: thus a genuine link is acquired after 
                                                             
62 M. L. McConnell, “‘...Darkening Confusion Mounted Upon Darkening Confusion’: The Search for the Elusive 
Genuine Link”, (1985) 16 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 365 at 376. 
63 H. W. Wefers Bettinck, “Open Registry, the Genuine Link and the 1986 Convention on Registration Conditions 
for Ships”, (1987) 18 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 69 at 86. 
64 D. H. N. Johnson, “The Nationality of Ships”, (1959) 8 Indian Yearbook of International Affairs 3. 
65 R.-J. Dupuy and D. Vignes, (eds.), A Handbook of the New Law of the Sea  (1991), pp. 403-5. 
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registration rather than before.67  Similarly, Ready argues that the genuine link, being 
expressed in terms of flag State jurisdiction and control over the ship, seems to arise ex post 
facto after the ship has been registered.  “If the genuine link is seen in these terms, there 
seems no reason to deny the existence of such a link in the case of ships entered in a 
properly administered open registry.”68  
  
Finally, there is a group of writers, who come predominantly from the States which were the 
most ardent supporters of the genuine link requirement at the 1958 Conference and in the 
IMCO case and who are particularly supportive of the genuine link.  For example, Sorensen 
states that while no attempt was made by the International Law Commission or the 1958 
Conference to define a genuine link, among the criteria which can be used for such a 
definition are the nationality or domicile of the owner, his principal place of business and the 
nationality of officers and crew.  In the case of ships owned by companies, the criteria may 
include nationality or domicile of the shareholders or a proportion of them.  As regards the 
effective exercise of jurisdiction clause, Sorensen concludes that this “in effect relates the 
‘genuine link’ not only to the qualities of the ship and its owner, but also to the legal 
possibilities of the State to control the ship.  If such possibilities are absent, the State is not 
entitled to enter or to maintain the ship on its register.”69  This view is also supported by 
Verzijl,70 Mender71 and various French writers.72 In fairly similar vein, Singh suggests that a 
genuine link will be constituted where one or more of the following factors exist: beneficial 
ownership of the ship by nationals of the flag State; manning of the ship by officers and crew 
having the nationality of the flag State; and the enactment of appropriate legislation by the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
66 S. W. Tache, “The Nationality of Ships: The Definitional Controversy and Enforcement of the Genuine Link”, 
(1982) 16 International Lawyer 301 at 305 (footnotes in original omitted). 
67 H. E. Anderson, “The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics and Alternatives”, 
(1996) 21 Tulane Maritime Law Journal  139 at 149. 
68 N. P. Ready, Ship Registration  (3rd edition, 1998), p. 15. 
69 M. Sorensen, “The Law of the Sea”, (1958) 520 International Conciliation  195 at 204-5. 
70 J. H. W. Verzijl, “The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 1958”, (1959) 6 Netherlands 
International Law Review 115. 
71 P. G. Mender, “Nationality of Ships: Politics and Law”, (1961) 5 Arkiv for Sjörett 265 at 350-67. Mender also 
argues that other States may challenge the exercise of discretion by a flag State in granting its nationality to a ship 
(at p. 356). 
72 R. Pinto, “Flags of Convenience”, (1960) 87 Journal du Droit International 344 at 363; J-M. Roux, Les 
Pavillons de Complaisance (1961), p. 71; and M-R. Simmonet, La Convention sur la Haute Mer  (1964), p. 
70: all as quoted in Dupuy and Vignes, op. cit., p. 405. 
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flag State to control the operation, management and running of its ships.73  Last, but very 
definitely not least, are the views of Meyers, the author of the standard (if somewhat dated) 
monograph on the nationality of ships.74  He points out that while the term “genuine link” is 
vague, international law in general, and the 1958 Convention in particular, often contain 
vague and general terms: in this case the expression is manageable.  The term “genuine link” 
is a collective expression for a flag State’s means of establishing and maintaining sufficient 
authority over its ships.  “Means” in this context are, on the one hand, the circumstances of 
fact relating to the government agencies charged with the control of ships (in particular their 
number, ability, equipment etc.) and, on the other hand, the circumstances of fact relating to 
the “ship-users or their goods” (in particular, the circumstances which bring the ship-user 
within the reach of the said government agencies such as his business connections with the 
flag State).75  Effective jurisdiction and control are not criteria for establishing a genuine link, 
but the results a genuine link should bring.  “It is a condition ‘governing nationality’ that the 
State should create a link such that it can always exercise effective control over the ship.”76  
However, it is not a requirement of international law that the genuine link take an economic 
form, such as requiring the beneficial owner, operator or crew to have the nationality of the 
flag State.  As regards the consequences of the lack of a genuine link, Meyers argues that 
the fact that the clause beginning “nevertheless, for the purposes of recognition” in the 
International Law Commission’s draft was deleted at the 1958 Conference, does not 
necessarily mean that non-recognition is prohibited.  There were probably other reasons for 
the deletion of the clause than a wish to prohibit non-recognition.  Thus, Meyers argues that 
non-recognition is still possible where there is no genuine link, although the burden of proof 
that the link is not genuine rests on the non-recognising State.77 
 
It is obvious from this brief survey that there is no consensus among writers as to what is 
meant by a genuine link or the consequences that follow from its absence. Indeed, opinions 
on these questions are so diverse that it cannot even be said that a predominant view 
emerges. 
                                                             
73 N. Singh, “International Law Problems of Merchant Shipping”, (1962) 107 Recueil des Cours  1 at 55-64. 
74 H Meyers, The Nationality of Ships (1967).  Chapter IV deals with the genuine link. 
75 Ibid., pp. 249-52. 
76 Ibid., p. 218. 
77 Ibid., pp. 282-3. 
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3.6  Conclusions 
 
There was general agreement in the International Law Commission and at the 1958 
Conference that the registration of a ship (and thereby the conferment of nationality upon 
that ship) is more than a mere administrative formality; and this conclusion is reinforced by 
the context of Article 5(1) of the 1958 Convention, namely Article 6(1). There must be a 
link between the ship and the flag State, and that link must be “genuine”.  There is no 
express definition of “genuine” in the Convention text.  If we interpret “genuine” in good 
faith in its ordinary meaning (as directed by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties), this means that there must be some real link or, in the French text, some 
substantial link between the flag State and the ship, not an artificial or tenuous link.  But it is 
not clear what is required to constitute such a link.  It would seem from the preponderance 
of views expressed at the 1958 Conference and in the pleadings in the IMCO case that with 
the possible exception of the effective exercise of flag State jurisdiction and control, there is 
no agreed single requirement for establishing a genuine link.  States have a choice of means 
for doing so.  A genuine link could be established by, for example, requiring all or a majority 
of the beneficial owners and/or crew of a ship to have the nationality of the flag State.  It 
must be pointed out, however, that there was no support either in the International Law 
Commission or at the 1958 Conference for making such requirements compulsory or the 
sole criteria for a genuine link.  There seems much more agreement that the effective 
exercise of flag State jurisdiction constitutes an essential requirement of the genuine link.  
This follows from the travaux préparatoires, the IMCO case pleadings and the wording of 
Article 5 itself.  Such a criterion best supports the object and purpose of the 1958 
Convention (cf. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) which is to 
ensure that there is order on the high seas.  The problem with the effective exercise of 
jurisdiction criterion is that it is vague and risks being subjectively interpreted and applied.  It 
is also not clear what might be required as a corollary of the effective exercise of jurisdiction; 
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whether, for example, it requires that the shipowner has a manager or agent resident in the 
flag State or that the ship calls at ports where the flag State has the necessary facilities to 
carry out the kinds of surveying and certification activities which are imposed on flag States 
by various international conventions. 
 
As regards the other issue which is the subject of this study, namely the consequences of the 
lack of a genuine link, again nothing is said in the High Seas Convention about this, and a 
proposal by the International Law Commission specifically providing for non-recognition of 
the national character of a ship in such circumstances was in fact deleted at the 1958 
Conference.  This action might suggest that it was intended that no consequences should 
follow where there is a lack of a genuine link.  Meyers points out, however, that logically this 
is not the only conclusion that can be drawn from the Conference’s decision to delete the 
phrase.  Alternative conclusions are that the phrase was deleted because of its inelegance, its 
technical weakness or the risk of its being misinterpreted. 78  If no consequences followed 
where there was no genuine link, this would render the requirement of a genuine link 
pointless, because a ship would be in exactly the same position whether it had a genuine link 
with the flag State or not.  It is a basic maxim of treaty interpretation that the provisions of a 
treaty should be interpreted to be effective rather than ineffective and should be assumed to 
have a meaning and a purpose.79  It must therefore follow that some consequences must 
result where there is no genuine link.  This is supported both by Judge Jessup’s observations 
in the Barcelona Traction case and by the Nottebohm case, where the International Court 
of Justice held that where nationality is conferred by a State under its national law, that 
nationality will be perfectly valid by national law, but it may not necessarily be entitled to 
recognition by other States.  It may therefore legitimately be concluded that a ship without a 
genuine link is at risk of having its nationality not recognised by another State, or at least of 
its flag State being denied the right to exercise diplomatic protection on its behalf.  What 
precise consequences might follow from the non-recognition of nationality are, however, 
uncertain.  It could be that the ship would be regarded as stateless, but this would not 
necessarily entitle other States to exercise jurisdiction over it on the high seas.  While 
                                                             
78 Meyers, op. cit., pp. 278 -9. 
 40
stateless vessels do not have a flag State by definition, this does not mean that other States 
are entitled to exercise their jurisdiction over them, notwithstanding the decisions of some 
municipal law courts to the contrary.80  The State of the nationality of those on board or the 
State of nationality of the shipowner might still be able to exercise jurisdiction over activities 
on the ship, and to exercise diplomatic protection vis à vis other States.81   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
79 Sinclair, op. cit. in n. 14, p. 118. 
80 For example, Molvan v. the Attorney General for Palestine (The Asya)  [1948] AC 351; US v. Marino-
Garcia 679 F. 2d 1373, 1985 AMC 1815 (11th Circ. 1982).  
81 See further R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed., 1999), pp. 213-4. So, too, Anderson, 
op. cit. in n. 67, pp. 142-3.   
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 4. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
198282 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This Convention is the product of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, which was held between 1973 and 1982.  The Convention came into force on 
November 16, 1994.  As of May 5, 2000 the Convention had 133 parties.  The principal 
States with a significant interest in shipping which are not parties to the Convention are 
Canada, Denmark, Liberia, Turkey and the USA. 
 
Article 91 of the Convention provides as follows: 
 
 Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality 
 to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the 
 right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose 
 flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between 
 the State and the ship. (emphasis added) 
 
As will be noticed, Article 91 is identical to Article 5 of the 1958 High Seas Convention 
except for the omission of the phrase at the end of Article 5, namely “in particular, the State 
must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social 
matters over ships flying its flag.”  The omitted phrase is now to be found in Article 94(1).  
The remainder of Article 94 contains an extensive list of the duties of flag States which fill 
out the general obligation in paragraph 1.  The significance of this change from Article 5 of 
the 1958 Convention is commented on in sections 4.3 and 4.6 below. 
 
 
4.2 A Preliminary Approach to Interpretation 
 
                                                             
82 Text in (1982) 21 International Legal Materials 1245. 
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Like the 1958 Convention, the 1982 Convention does not state explicitly what is meant by a 
“genuine link” nor does it specify what consequences follow in the absence of such a link. 
As with the 1958 Convention, it is therefore necessary to attempt to interpret Article 91 and 
its provision concerning the genuine link, following the same approach as was taken with the 
1958 Convention and Article 5 in section 3. It should be noted at the outset that the French 
and Spanish terms for “geuuine limk” in Article 91 of the 1982 Convention (“lien 
substantiel” and “relacion autentica”) are the same as in Article 5 of the 1958 Convention.   
 
It will be recalled from section 3.2 above that in interpreting a treaty provision the point of 
departure is Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which directs us to 
interpret a particular provision in accordance with its ordinary meaning in its context and in 
the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.  Thus there are three things to be looked at: 
the ordinary meaning of the provision, the context, and the object and purpose of the 1982 
Convention.  As regards the ordinary meaning of the term “genuine link” in Article 91, the 
same comments can be made as were made in section 3.2 about Article 5 of the High Seas 
Convention.   
 
As far as the context of Article 91 is concerned, of the various materials mentioned in Article 
31(2) of the Vienna Convention, the only one relevant here is the text of the 1982 
Convention. There are three provisions of the Convention which must be considered as part 
of the context.  The first is Article 92, which is identical to Article 6 of the High Seas 
Convention (concerning the prohibition of a change of flag during a voyage or while a ship is 
in port, save where there is a real transfer of ownership or change of registry): the same 
comments can be made about it as were made in respect of Article 6 in section 3.2 above. 
The second provision of the 1982 Convention which can be considered as part of the 
context is Article 94, which, as mentioned above, contains an extensive list of flag State 
duties.  These include, inter alia, an obligation on a flag State to maintain a register of its 
ships and to apply generally accepted international standards in respect of the construction, 
equipment, seaworthiness and manning of ships, labour conditions and the training and 
qualifications of crews.   The leading commentary on the 1982 Convention points out that 
paragraph 1 of Article 94 has been taken from Article 5 of  the 1958 Convention where it 
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was originally adopted “for the purpose of strengthening the concept of ‘genuine link’ with 
regard to the nationality of a ship,” and goes on to say that the article “gives further 
indication of the link between the flag State and ships flying its flag” and that the “inability of 
the flag State to exercise its jurisdiction and control with respect to a ship flying its flag may 
have implications as to whether a genuine link exists between the flag State and that ship.”83  
The third provision in the Convention which is relevant as part of the context is Article 217, 
which requires flag States effectively to enforce rules concerning pollution in respect of their 
ships.  The Nordquist commentary points out that “this corresponds to, and amplifies, the 
general statement of the powers and duties of the flag State in Article 94,” and appears to 
suggest that the observance of this obligation is also relevant to the question of the existence 
of a “genuine link”.84   
 
It will be recalled from section 3.2 that Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties provides that there is to be taken into account, together with the context, 
“any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation.”  When discussing the practice of States parties to the 
High Seas Convention, it was suggested that practice in the form of legislation by States 
parties (the only form of practice by parties to that Convention) was too diverse to be 
regarded as “subsequent practice” within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention and therefore to be relevant to interpretation of the High Seas Convention.  The 
same comment can be made, even more forcefully, in respect of the 1982 Convention, since 
with many more parties than the 1958 Convention (including all the principal flag of 
convenience States except Liberia) practice in the form of legislation concerning the 
nationality of ships is even more diverse.  Furthermore, much of this legislation predates the 
1982 Convention and is therefore irrelevant, as “practice” in Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention refers only to practice subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty concerned.  
One other possible piece of practice may be mentioned.  In 1992 the UN Security Council 
adopted a resolution providing for the enforcement of economic sanctions against Serbia 
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84 Ibid., Vol. IV (1991), pp. 255 and 257.  
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and Montenegro, including the stopping and searching of ships on the high seas.85  
Paragraph 10 of the resolution stipulated that any ship in which the majority or controlling 
interest was held by a person operating from Serbia and Montenegro should be considered 
a ship of Serbia and Montenegro for the purposes of implementation of Security Council 
resolutions, regardless of the flag under which the ship sailed.  Could this resolution be 
regarded as subsequent practice relating to the application of the 1982 Convention, 
especially as regards the consequences of the absence of a genuine link?  The answer must 
clearly be no.  First, the Security Council, consisting as it does of only 15 States, could 
hardly be said to represent the parties to the Convention.  In any case, at the time of the 
adoption of the resolution in 1992, the Convention was not in force and none of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council had ratified the Convention.  Secondly, the 
resolution makes it clear that its provisions about looking behind the flag are for the purpose 
of implementing Security Council resolutions, and not the purpose of interpreting the 1982 
Convention or of upholding the genuine link requirement. Overall, therefore, there appears 
to be no practice by parties to the 1982 Convention which can be used as an aid to 
interpreting Article 91 as to the meaning of the term “genuine link” or the consequences that 
follow from its absence. 
 
As far as the third element of interpretation is concerned, the object and purpose of the 
treaty, the 1982 Convention in its preamble lists a number of objectives of the Convention.  
Of these, the most relevant is the statement in paragraph 4 of the preamble that the parties to 
it recognise the desirability of establishing, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, 
“a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and 
will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilisation 
of their resources, and the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.” Fairly similar conclusions can be drawn from 
this statement as to the light it sheds on the meaning of the genuine link as were drawn in 
respect of the unarticulated object and purpose of the 1958 Convention.  
 
                                                             
85 Resolution 787 of November 16, 1992. 
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As with the 1958 Convention, employing the approach to treaty interpretation set out in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reveals no clear and precise 
meaning of the term “genuine link”, although both the context and object and purpose of the 
Convention suggest that the link between a ship and its flag State must be such as to enable 
the latter to exercise effective control over its ships. Furthermore, applying Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention sheds no real light as to the consequences that follow in the absence of a 
genuine link between a ship and its flag State as there are no provisions in the 1982 
Convention dealing explicitly (or even implicitly) with this question. In the case of both 
issues, therefore, it is permissible and necessary to have recourse to Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention and consider the materials referred to there. 
 
 
4.3 Travaux Préparatoires 
 
As mentioned above, the 1982 Convention is the product of the Third UN Conference on 
the Law of the Sea.  This Conference worked in a very different way from the First UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, which produced the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.  
In particular, it had no set of draft articles before it prepared by the International Law 
Commission or any other body of experts.  Instead it was faced with a mass of proposals 
put forward by States, either individually or jointly in small groups.  As far as the high seas 
and the nationality of ships were concerned, most of the limited number of proposals which 
had been made were content merely to reproduce more or less verbatim the provisions of 
the 1958 Convention.  At the first substantive session of the Conference, in 1974, the many 
and varied proposals which had been made were grouped into a single document called 
“Main Trends”.  Provision 140 of this document was identical to Article 5 of the High Seas 
Convention.86  The Main Trends paper was refined in the following year by the chairman of 
Committee II (to which committee issues concerning the high seas and the nationality of 
ships had been assigned) into an Informal Single Negotiating Text, acting on work done (as 
far as the high seas were concerned) by the Informal Consultative Group on the High Seas.  
Article 77 of this Text was the same as Article 5 of the High Seas Convention with the 
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significant exception that the phrase at the end of Article 5, “in particular, the State must 
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters 
over ships flying its flag”, was deleted.87  Unfortunately the published records of the 
Conference do not explain why the Informal Consultative Group on the High Seas and the 
Chairman of Committee II made this change to Provision 140 of the Main Trends paper.  
The leading commentary on the Convention suggests that the provision about effective 
exercise of flag State jurisdiction was dropped from the last part of Provision 140 because it 
was repeated in paragraph 1 of Provision 142 (which dealt with flag State duties in a more 
comprehensive way than the 1958 Convention and eventually became Article 94 of the 
1982 Convention),88 but it does not comment on the possible significance of this change for 
the meaning of the term “genuine link.”89  The Informal Single Negotiating Text was 
followed by a number of further Negotiating Texts, eventually culminating in a draft 
Convention, but these made no further changes to the provisions of Article 77  of the 
Informal Single Negotiating Text.  One drafting change made to Article 91 (as Article 77 
subsequently became) at the 10th session of the Conference in 1981 was to change the 
phrase “each State”, used in Article 5 of the 1958 Convention and the various Negotiating 
Texts, to “every State.”  This change was made to harmonise Article 91 with other articles.  
Overall, while there was considerable focus on the duties of flag States to exercise their 
jurisdiction effectively over their ships, there appears to have been little discussion of the 
concept of the genuine link as such at the Third UN Conference. 
 
Thus, unlike the travaux préparatoires of the 1958 Convention, the travaux 
préparatoires of the 1982 Convention shed very little light on the meaning of the term 
“genuine link” or the consequences that follow where no such link exists.  Nevertheless, one 
observation may be made and a possible conclusion drawn.  It would not seem permissible 
to deduce from the difference between Article 5 of the High Seas Convention and Article 91 
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of the 1982 Convention that the effective exercise of flag State jurisdiction is no longer an 
element in the genuine link.  It does not seem that the drafters of the 1982 Convention had 
any intention, when deleting the effective exercise of jurisdiction phrase, of affecting the 
meaning of the term “genuine link”.  Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, the Nordquist 
commentary, in discussing Article 94 of the 1982 Convention, regards the inability of the flag 
State to exercise its jurisdiction effectively in respect of its ships as having implications as to 
whether a genuine link exists between the flag State and its ships.   
 
 
4.4 Decisions of Courts  
 
This section looks at decisions of courts to see if they shed any light on the questions with 
which this study is concerned.  The courts whose decisions will be examined are the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the European Court of Justice.   
 
4.4.1 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
 
Of the small number of cases which have so far been decided by the Tribunal, one is 
concerned to a considerable degree with the issues which are the subject of this study.  This 
is the M/V Saiga (No.2) Case (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), in which the 
Tribunal gave its judgement in July 1999.90  The case concerned the arrest by Guinea of the 
M/V Saiga, an oil tanker used for supplying gas oil to fishing vessels off West Africa, for 
alleged violations of Guinea’s customs laws.  The Saiga was registered in St. Vincent, 
owned by a Cypriot company, managed by a Scottish company, chartered to a Swiss 
company and its officers and crew were Ukrainian.  St Vincent argued that the arrest was 
contrary to international law.   
 
At the outset of its judgement, the Tribunal had to deal with various objections by Guinea to 
the admissibility of St. Vincent’s claims. Guinea argued that the Saiga had not been validly 
                                                             
90 (1999) 38 International Legal Materials 323; also on the internet at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Judg_E.htm. 
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registered in St. Vincent at the time of its arrest by Guinea, but that even if it had been, there 
was no genuine link between the Saiga and St. Vincent and therefore St. Vincent was not 
competent to bring a claim on behalf of the Saiga.  As regards Guinea’s first objection, the 
Tribunal observed that by virtue of Article 91 of the 1982 Convention, which in this respect 
“codifies a well-established rule of general international law,”91 the granting of nationality to 
a ship is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State concerned and it is up to that 
State to regulate by its domestic law the conditions for the grant of nationality.  The Tribunal 
found as a question of fact that at the relevant time the Saiga was validly registered under 
the law of St. Vincent as one of its ships and therefore had its nationality.  The Tribunal also 
concluded that by not challenging the nationality of the Saiga until its counter-memorial, 
when it had had every opportunity to do so in the earlier proceedings in the case, including 
the orders for prompt release of the vessel and provisional measures, and by its other 
conduct accepting the nationality of the ship, Guinea could not successfully challenge the 
registration and nationality of the Saiga at the merits stage of the case.   
 
As regards Guinea’s other objections to admissibility, the Tribunal, rather curiously perhaps, 
dealt with the question of whether the absence of a genuine link between a flag State and a 
ship entitled another State to refuse to recognise the nationality of that ship before dealing 
with the question of whether there was a genuine link between the Saiga and St. Vincent.  
As to the former question, the Tribunal began by noting that the provision of Article 91 
concerning the genuine link did not provide an answer to this question, nor did Articles 92 
and 94 “which together with Article 91 constitute the context of the provision.”92  The 
Tribunal then noted that the International Law Commission’s proposal that “for purposes of 
recognition of the national character of the ship by other States, there must exist a genuine 
link between the State and the ship” was not adopted at the 1958 Conference.  The 
Tribunal went on to examine Article 94 of the 1982 Convention and to point out that under 
that Article the action which other States can take where a flag State is believed not to have 
exercised proper jurisdiction and control over one of its ships is limited to reporting the 
matter to the flag State. “There is nothing in Article 94 to permit a State which discovers 
                                                             
91 Judgement, para. 63. 
92 Judgement, para. 80. 
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evidence indicating the absence of proper jurisdiction and control by a flag State over a ship 
to refuse to recognise the right of the ship to fly the flag of the flag State.”93  The Tribunal 
therefore concluded that: 
 
The purpose of the provisions of the Convention on the need for a genuine link between a ship and its 
flag State is to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State, and not to establish 
criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a flag State may be challenged by 
other States.94   
 
The Tribunal added that its conclusion was “further strengthened” by the 1993 FAO 
Compliance Agreement95 and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement96 which “set out, inter 
alia, detailed obligations to be discharged by the flag States of fishing vessels but do not 
deal with the conditions to be satisfied for the registration of fishing vessels.”97  Nor did the 
Tribunal find that its conclusion was affected by the 1986 United Nations Convention on 
Conditions for the Registration of Ships.98  The Tribunal therefore held, by 18 votes to 2 
(Judges Warioba and Ndiaye dissenting), that “there is no legal basis for the claim of Guinea 
that it can refuse to recognise the right of the Saiga to fly the flag of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines on the ground that there was no genuine link between the ship and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines.”99 
 
As regards the question of whether there was a genuine link between the Saiga and St. 
Vincent, the Tribunal dealt with this in a single sentence, confining itself to finding that “the 
evidence adduced by Guinea is not sufficient to justify its contention that there was no 
genuine link between the ship and St. Vincent and the Grenadines at the material time.”100  
As far as the evidence put forward by Guinea is concerned, all that is mentioned by the 
Tribunal in its judgement is Guinea’s assertion that for a genuine link the flag State must 
                                                             
93 Judgement, para. 82. 
94 Judgement, para. 83. 
95 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas, 1993. (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 968; discussed further in Section 5.2 
below. 
96 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995. 
(1995) 34 International Legal Materials 1542. 
97 Judgement, para. 85. 
98 (1986) 7 Law of the Sea Bulletin 87.  The Convention is discussed in Section 5.1 below. 
99 Judgement, para. 86. 
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exercise prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over the owner or, as the case may be, 
the operator of the ship.  The counter-arguments of St. Vincent referred to by the Tribunal 
include the fact that the owner of the Saiga was represented in St. Vincent by a company 
formed and established in St. Vincent; the fact that the Saiga was subject to the supervision 
of the Vincentian authorities to secure compliance with the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
and other IMO conventions; and the fact that arrangements had been made to secure 
regular supervision of the Saiga’s seaworthiness through surveys conducted by reputable 
classification societies authorised by St. Vincent. 
 
As far as the question of the meaning of the “genuine link” requirement is concerned, it is 
submitted that the Tribunal’s judgement does not shed much light on this matter.  The 
Tribunal appears to take the view that the burden of proof is on the State asserting the 
absence of a genuine link to show such absence; in other words, there is a presumption that 
the link between a State and a ship flying its flag is genuine.  This seems a perfectly 
reasonable position to take.  However, the Tribunal does not state specifically what 
evidence was put forward by Guinea nor why this caused it to conclude that Guinea had not 
persuaded it that the link between the Saiga and St. Vincent was not genuine.  It is therefore 
not clear what factors the Tribunal regards as relevant to the existence or otherwise of a 
genuine link, although the first part of its conclusion in paragraph 83 on the consequences of 
the absence of a genuine link, in the indented quotation above, suggests that effective 
exercise of flag State jurisdiction is a central element in the existence of a genuine link.  The 
failure of the Tribunal to deal with this issue more fully may be due to the fact that Guinea did 
not apparently argue the point particularly fully or well, and/or to the Tribunal’s view 
(referred to above) that if Guinea was going to contest the competence of St. Vincent to 
represent the Saiga, it should have done so earlier in the proceedings.  In the indented 
quotation from paragraph 83 above, the Tribunal concludes that the purpose of the genuine 
link is “not to establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in 
a flag State may be challenged by other States.”  It is not clear whether the Tribunal also 
means by this that the existence or otherwise of a genuine link is not relevant to the question 
                                                                                                                                                                             
100 Judgement, para. 87. 
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of nationality but only to the question of the effective exercise of flag State jurisdiction, 101 but 
if so, this is difficult to accept.  The requirement of the genuine link is contained in Article 91, 
dealing with the nationality of ships, not Article 94 dealing with the effective exercise of flag 
State jurisdiction.  The change between Article 5 of the High Seas Convention and Article 
91 of the 1982 Convention if anything strengthens the view that the question of the genuine 
link is concerned with the question of nationality of ships.  Furthermore, the drafting history 
of Article 5 of the High Seas Convention makes it very clear that the requirement of a 
genuine link is a requirement for the nationality of a ship.   
 
As has been seen, the Tribunal concludes that the absence of a genuine link between a ship 
and the flag State does not entitle other States not to recognise the nationality of that ship.  
This is a tenable conclusion that can be drawn from the drafting history of Article 5 of the 
1958 Convention and Article 91 of the 1982 Convention.  On the other hand, the Tribunal’s 
apparent suggestion that the non-entitlement of other States not to recognise the nationality 
of a ship also follows from Article 94(6) of the 1982 Convention (under which a State which 
believes that a flag State is not exercising proper jjurisdiction and control is limited to 
reporting the matter to the flag State) is surely questionable.  As was argued in section 3.6 
above and as will be argued below, effective exercise of jurisdiction is not to be be wholly 
equated with the genuine link. It therefore follows that the fact that a State is limited in the 
action which it can take in respect of a flag State’s failure to exercise the various obligations 
imposed on it by Article 94, does not mean that no action can be taken where there is no 
genuine link as required by Article 91.  The Tribunal does not, however, state what 
consequences (if any) do follow where the requrement of Article 91 is not met.  It was 
suggested in section 3.6 above that some consequence must follow or the requirement of a 
genuine link serves no purpose.  Of course, the Tribunal was only concerned with the 
question of whether the absence of a genuine link entitled other States not to recognise the 
nationality of the ship concerned, not with other possible consequences of such an absence.  
In any case, having decided that there was a genuine link between the Saiga and St. 
                                                             
101 Note that Judge Anderson, in his separate opinion, commented: “I do not read paragraph 83 of the Judgement as 
going so far as to say that the requirement of a ‘genuine link’. . . has no relevance at all to the grant of nationality.” 
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Vincent, the question of the consequence of the absence of such a link did not strictly need 
to be considered.   
 
Some of the separate judgements given by judges in the majority in the Saiga case are 
worth referring to for the light they throw on the issues dealt with in this study. Judge 
Anderson pointed out that the requirement of a genuine link “contains an element of good 
faith in the word ‘genuine’,” while President Mensah, discussing the question of whether St. 
Vincent had validly conferred its nationality on the Saiga, pointed out that while Article 91 
of the 1982 Convention accords to each State the exclusive right to set the conditions for 
the acquisition of its nationality by ships, “that provision does not also support the 
proposition that a ship can acquire nationality merely because an official of the State 
declares that it has such nationality.”  President Mensah also added that St. Vincent’s 
practice of allowing ships provisional registration could have considerable implications for 
the effective implementation of the 1982 Convention’s provisions on nationality of ships, and 
that allowing a provisional registration to lapse before issuing a permanent registration (as 
had happened in this case) was contrary to Article 91.  These sentiments were also shared 
by Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Anderson.   
 
 
4.4.2 The European Court of Justice 
 
It will be recalled from section 3.4.2 above that in a number of cases the European Court of 
Justice has discussed Article 5 of the High Seas Convention.  In two of those cases the 
Court also referred to Article 91 of the 1982 Convention.  In the Poulsen case,102 which 
concerned a Danish-owned, Panamanian-registered ship engaged in alleged illegal salmon 
fishing, the Court’s observation that the competence of a State under Article 5 of the High 
Seas Convention to establish the conditions on which it would grant its nationality to a ship 
was within its absolute discretion,103 applied equally to Article 91.  Secondly, and possibly 
more significantly, Advocate General Tesauro, in his opinion in Commission v. Hellenic 
                                                             
102 Loc. cit. in n. 51 
103 See text at n. 52. 
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Republic,104 after concluding that the genuine link requirement of Article 5 of the High Seas 
Convention was not a condition for the granting of nationality but a duty of supervision 
resulting from the grant of nationality,105 added that the same conclusion could be drawn 
with regard to the 1982 Convention,  
 
 which, on the one hand, repeats the wording used in the Geneva Convention without shedding any 
further light on the concept of ‘genuine link’ (Article 91) and, on the other,  appears to rule out the possibility 
that States might refuse to recognise the nationality  granted to a ship in the absence of a ‘genuine link.’  A 
State which has clear grounds to  believe that proper jurisdiction and control with respect to a ship have not 
been exercised  may simply ‘report the facts to the flag State,’ which. ‘if appropriate,’ may ‘take any action 
 necessary to remedy the situation.’106 
 
This position is, of course, similar to that taken by the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea in the Saiga case, and is open to the same comments and criticism. 
 
 
4.5 The Views of Writers 
 
It was seen in section 3.5 above that Article 5 of the High Seas Convention and the concept 
of the genuine link have attracted a considerable literature.  By comparison relatively little 
has been written about Article 91 of the 1982 Convention.  Those who have written on the 
subject (all of whom had done so before the judgement of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea in the Saiga case) tend to divide into three broad camps - those who 
consider that the difference in text between Article 91 and Article 5 (the removal of the 
phrase concerning the effective exercise of jurisdiction by the flag State) has weakened the 
concept of the genuine link; those who feel that it has made no difference; and those who 
feel that it has strengthened the genuine link.   
 
The first of these camps is exemplified by Brown.  He concludes that the inclusion of flag 
State duties in a separate article and “the absence of any link between it and the genuine link 
                                                             
104 Loc.cit. in n. 49. 
105 See text at n. 50. 
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provision in Article  91(1) at the very least increases the difficulty of arguing that a failure by 
the flag State to perform its duties under Article 94 would provide evidence of the absence 
of a genuine link between it and the ship concerned.”107 
 
The second view, that Article  91 of the 1982 Convention makes essentially no change in the 
position, is taken by McConnell, who states that “the question of attribution of nationality 
and ‘genuine link’ is not clarified to any extent by the 1982 Convention.  Despite increased 
flag State obligations, the exact tie-in to grant of nationality remains undefined.”  She adds 
that it is difficult to believe that failure of a flag State to comply with the requirements of 
Article 94 would render national registration a nullity. 108  She also quotes Moore as stating 
that “there was no intention by the [Third UN] Conference to change existing international 
law on the question of flags of convenience or open registries in general and there was 
certainly no intention to add any new requirement of economic link.  In fact, I would say that 
the general intention of the Conference in dealing with these issues was to avoid opening yet 
another controversial problem . . . and from what I understand the separation of sentences in 
Articles 91 and 94, . . . was merely a drafting matter.”109  Likewise Wolfrum is of the view 
that Article 91 makes no change in the position and adds that the rules of the 1982 
Convention “affirm that effective exercise of jurisdicion and control is not a precondition for 
registration.”  A State’s failure to exercise effective jurisdiction and control “therefore 
cannot invalidate the State’s registration of a ship”.110 
 
A third view is that the genuine link requirement has been strengthened by the 1982 
Convention.  Kano has argued that the effect of Articles 91 and 94 is that “the concept of 
‘genuine link’ no longer lends itself to an interpretation that the State granting its nationality to 
ships has an obligation to effectively exercise jurisdiction and control in administrative, 
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.  Instead it must be interpreted to mean 
                                                                                                                                                                             
106 Para. 14 of the Advocate General’s Opinion. In the final sentence the Advocate General is quoting from Art. 
94(6) of the 1982 Convention. 
107 E. D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1994), pp. 288-9. 
108 Op. cit. in n. 62, pp. 381-2. 
109 J. N. Moore, speaking at a panel discussion on flags of convenience, cited in New Trends in Maritime 
Navigation. Proceedings of the Fourth International Ocean Symposium (1979), p. 69 at 70-1, as quoted 
in McConnell, op. cit. in n. 62, p. 382. 
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that the existence of a genuine link between the State and the ship constitutes a requirement 
for the grant of nationality to ships.”111 
 
 
4.6 Conclusions  
 
Article 91 of the 1982 Convention repeats Article 5 of the High Seas Convention verbatim 
with the exception that the phrase at the end of Article 5, about the effective exercise of flag 
State jurisdiction, was deleted.  It appears that the sole reason for this change was to avoid 
repetition with the first paragraph of Article 94, which contains an extensive list of flag State 
duties.  It may therefore be concluded that the requirement of the genuine link has the same 
meaning in the 1982 Convention as it has in the High Seas Convention, even if this meaning 
is not made explicit in either Convention.  The suggestion made in section 3.6 above that the 
ability of the flag State effectively to exercise its jurisdiction over its ships is an important 
element of the genuine link, is bolstered by the context of the genuine link requirement in the 
1982 Convention, which includes Articles 94 and 217 which elaborate the duties of flag 
States in respect of their ships112; by the object and purpose of the Convention as expressed 
in its preamble, in particular the need for order on the seas (see section 4.2 above); and 
dicta in the Saiga case. This view is broadly shared by the UN Secretary-General, who in 
his most recent report on “Oceans and the Law of the Sea” writes:  
 
 In view of the obligations of flag States under Articles 94 and 217 of UNCLOS, the  requirement of 
a genuine link in Article 91, while not defined, does imply that the link must  be such as to enable the flag State 
to exercise effective control over the ship and to meet its  obligations under UNCLOS and other instruments.113 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
110 R. Wolfrum, “Reflagging and Escort Operation in the Persian Gulf: An International Law  Perspective”, (1989) 
29 Virginia Journal of International Law 387 at 392. 
111T. Kano, “Flags of Convenience,” in New Trends in Maritime Navigation, op. cit. in n. 109, p. 63 at 64, as 
quoted in McConnell, op. cit. in n. 62, p. 382. 
112 The importance of the context of the Convention and the need to view the Convention as a whole is underlined 
by the fact that in its annual Law of the Sea Resolutions the UN General Assembly invariably emphasises the 
“unified character of the Convention”: see, for example, Resolution 54/31 (1999). 
113 UN Document A/54/429, para. 184. 
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The Saiga case suggests that there is a presumption that a genuine link does exist between a 
ship and its flag State, so that the burden of proof is on a State which disputes this to show 
the absence of such a link. 
 
As regards the consequences that follow from the absence of a genuine link, the 1982 
Convention, like the High Seas Convention, does not deal with this explicitly and sheds no 
further light on the matter.  It must be noted that both the judgement in the Saiga case and 
the opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Commission v. Hellenic Republic  express the 
view that the consequences of the absence of a genuine link do not include non-recognition 
of the nationality of the ship by other States.  In this connection it is worth noting an 
interesting comment made recently by Oxman and Bantz.114  They suggest that Article 
228(1) of the 1982 Convention (which denies a flag State that has repeatedly disregarded 
its enforcement obligations the privilege of the suspension of prosecutions by other States for 
pollution offences by its ships), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (which denies fishing rights 
to vessels of States that fail to join regional fisheries organisations or fish in accordance with 
their measures), and the 1995 amendments to the International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (under which a flag State’s 
certificates will be accepted where the compliance of that State with relevant international 
standards has been confirmed by the International Maritime Organisation) all indicate “an 
emerging tendency to link the enjoyment of rights to the performance of related duties.”  
Following this line of reasoning, one could equally conclude that the failure of a flag State to 
comply with its duty to ensure a genuine link between itself and its ships would deny that 
State the right to exercise rights in respect of such ships, including, for example, the right to 
exercise diplomatic protection.  
                                                             
114 B. H. Oxman and V. Bantz, case note on the Saiga  case, (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 
140 at 149. 
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5. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONALITY 
OF SHIPS 
 
This section examines a number of developments since the adoption of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 which, it is believed, shed some light on the 
meaning of the genuine link requirement.  The section focuses particularly on activities within 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO).   
 
 
5.1 UNCTAD 
 
In 1974 UNCTAD’s Committee on Shipping unanimously adopted a resolution in which it 
considered that the question of the “economic consequences for international shipping of the 
existence or lack of a genuine link between vessel and flag of registry as explicitly defined in 
international conventions in force” was a matter which was “suitable and ripe for 
harmonisation.”115  At the request of the Committee, the UNCTAD Secretariat 
subsequently produced a number of reports on this issue.  UNCTAD’s involvement in this 
matter was prompted by a desire by developing States (other than flags of convenience) to 
increase their share of world tonnage to aid their economic development: it was argued that 
tightening up the conditions of registration would lead to a phasing-out of flags of 
convenience (open registries) and a transfer of shipping tonnage to developing States.116 
 
In 1977 the Committee convened an ad hoc intergovernmental working group which in 
1978 unanimously adopted a resolution in which it inter alia considered that elements which 
were particularly relevant when determining whether a genuine link existed were the 
contribution of the flag State’s ships to its economy, employment of flag State nationals on 
                                                             
115 Resolution 22 (VI), para. 3, as quoted in G. Marston, “The UN Convention on Registration of Ships”, (1986) 
20 Journal of World Trade Law 575. 
116 On this issue, see further McConnell, op. cit. in n. 62, pp. 387-9. 
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its ships and beneficial ownership of ships by flag State nationals.117  In other words, there 
was a strong emphasis on the genuine link being an economic link, the argument being that 
an economic link was necessary if a flag State was to exercise effective jurisdiction and 
control over its ships.118 
 
In 1981 the Committee on Shipping decided to recommend the holding of a plenipotentiary 
conference to consider the adoption of an international agreement on the conditions for 
registration of ships, which should be preceded by an intergovernmental preparatory group 
with the task of drawing up a set of basic principles.  The Conference thus called for met in 
three sessions between July 1984 and February 1986.  The Conference, and indeed the 
intergovernmental preparatory group, revealed considerable differences of opinion over 
what the elements of a genuine link were or should be.  On the one hand, developing States 
argued that for a genuine link to exist the owner, operator, manager and crew of a ship 
should be nationals of the flag State.  The developed States, on the other hand, many of 
which were now much less ardent supporters of the genuine link than they had been at the 
First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 (in part because an increasing number 
of their national shipowners had registered their vessels under flags of convenience), were 
opposed to defining the genuine link in economic terms and stressed the traditional element 
of effective exercise of jurisdiction and control by the flag State.  Flag of convenience States 
were opposed to any restrictions on the right (as they saw it) of flag States to determine the 
conditions on which nationality was granted to ships.  These differences of view were 
overcome when the developing States proposed, and the developed States accepted, a 
compromise whereby nationality requirements would be imposed for manning or ownership, 
but not for both.  On the basis of this compromise, the Conference succeeded in adopting 
the UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships.119 
 
5.1.1 UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 1986 
                                                             
117 Report of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Economic Consequences of the Existence or 
Lack of a Genuine Link between Vessel and Flag of Registry, TD/B/C.4/177, Annex. 
118 McConnell, op. cit. in n. 62, p. 389. 
119 For the text of the Convention see (1987) 28 International Legal Materials 1229.  For a more detailed 
account of the work of UNCTAD in relation to the genuine link than that given above, see McConnell, op. cit. in 
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The preamble to the Convention contains several references to the genuine link, which are 
worthy of reproduction in full. 
 
 The States Parties to this Convention... 
 recalling also that according to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea there must exist a genuine link between a  ship 
and the flag State and conscious of the duties of the flag State to exercise effectively its  jurisdiction and control 
over ships flying its flag in accordance with the principle of the  genuine link, 
 believing that to this end a flag State should have a competent and adequate national  maritime 
administration,  
 believing also that in order to exercise its control function effectively a flag State should 
 ensure that those who are responsible for the management and operation of a ship on its  register are 
readily identifiable and accountable... 
 reaffirming, without prejudice to this Convention, that each State shall fix the conditions for  the 
grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory and for the right  to fly its flag,  
 prompted  by the desire among sovereign States to resolve in a spirit of mutual understanding  and 
co-operation all issues relating to the conditions for the grant of nationality to, and for  the registration of 
ships... 
 
Article 1 is headed “Objectives” and provides as follows: 
 
 For the purpose of ensuring or, as the case may be, strengthening the genuine link between a  State 
and ships flying its flag, and in order to exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control  over such ships with 
regard to identification and accountability of shipowners and operators  as well as with regard to 
administrative, technical, economic and social matters, a flag State  shall apply the provisions contained in this 
Convention. 
 
Conditions for the registration (and hence nationality) of ships, designed to ensure the 
objective of the Convention set out in Article 1 of ensuring or strengthening the genuine link, 
are laid down in Articles 7 - 10.  Article 7 requires a State to comply with either Article 8 
(relating to equity participation) or Article 9(1) - (3) (relating to manning).  Article 8 
provides that the flag State shall lay down in its laws and regulations “appropriate provisions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
n. 62, pp. 386-94 and H.W. Wefers Bettink, “Open Registry, the Genuine Link and the 1986 Convention on 
Registration Conditions for Ships”, (1987) 18 Netherlands Year Book of International Law  70 at 99-112. 
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for participation by that State or its nationals as owners of ships flying its flag or in the 
ownership of such ships and for the level of such participation.  These laws and regulations 
should be sufficient to permit the flag State to exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control 
over ships flying its flag.”  Article 9 provides that a State of registration “shall observe the 
principle that a satisfactory part of the complement consisting of officers and crew of ships 
flying its flag be nationals or persons domiciled or lawfully in permanent residence in that 
State.”  In doing so, the State of registration shall have regard to, inter alia, the availability 
of qualified seafarers from that State and “the sound and economically viable operation of its 
ships.”  Article 10 provides that before a ship is registered, the State of registration shall 
ensure that the shipowning company or a subsidiary company “is established and/or has its 
principal place of business within its territory.”  Where this is not the case, the State of 
registration shall ensure that there is “a representative or management person” who is a 
national or is domiciled in its territory.  Such a representative or management person must be 
available for any legal process and to meet the shipowner’s responsibilities in accordance 
with the laws and regulations of the State of registration.  In addition, the State of registration 
must maintain a detailed register from which the owner and operator, or any other person 
who can be held accountable for the management or operation of the ship, can be readily 
identified (Articles 6 and 11).  The State of registration must also maintain a competent and 
effective maritime administration in order to secure compliance with national and 
international shipping rules concerning safety and pollution control (Article 5).   
 
The compromise nature of the Convention is evident from its drafting.  Much of the language 
is loose and imprecise, especially in relation to the degree of equity participation and 
manning by nationals which is required under Articles 8 and 9.  Although the Convention 
secures some tightening of the conditions under which States may register ships and thus 
grant their nationality to them,  the State of registration is still left with considerable discretion 
in this matter.120  
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A major drawback of the Convention is that it is not in force.  To enter into force the 
Convention requires ratification by 40 States, the combined tonnage of which amounts to at 
least 25 per cent of world tonnage.  As of December 31, 1999 the Convention had been 
ratified by 11 States (Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Iraq, 
Libya, Mexico and Oman) whose combined tonnage amounted to about 1.4 per cent of 
world tonnage.  No traditional maritime or flag of convenience State has yet ratified the 
Convention.  Given the pattern and slow rate of ratification, it is likely to be many years, if 
ever, before the Convention enters into force. 
 
Although the Convention is not in force, the question may be asked whether it can be used 
as an aid in interpreting the genuine link requirement in the High Seas Convention and the 
1982 Convention.  Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides 
that there shall be taken into account, together with the context, “any subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions.”  Can the 1986 Ship Registration Convention be regarded as such a subsequent 
agreement?  Clearly the Convention is subsequent to both the High Seas Convention and the 
1982 Convention.  However, the following questions need to be asked: (1) does the term 
“agreement” in Article 31 (3) include agreements not (yet) in force? (2) can the 1986 
Convention be said to be between parties to the High Seas Convention and/or the 1982 
Convention? and (3) can the 1986 Convention be described as “regarding the 
interpretation” of the High Seas Convention and/or the 1982 Convention or “the 
application” of their provisions?  There is no discussion of the issues raised by these 
questions in the commentary of the International Law Commission on the draft articles which 
subsequently became the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, nor in the case law of 
international courts and tribunals nor (as far as has been discovered) in the academic 
literature, probably because instances of subsequent agreements of the kind contemplated 
by Article 31(3) are relatively rare in practice.  However, common sense suggests that the 
subsequent agreement must be in force and that the parties to it must be largely the same as, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
[1987] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 97; and Wefers Bettinck, op. cit. in n. 119, pp. 
112-119. 
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if not identical to, those of the earlier treaty.121  Neither of these conditions is satisfied here.  
Thus the 1986 Convention is not a subsequent agreement within the meaning of Article 
31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and thus is not to be taken into 
account in interpreting the High Seas Convention and the 1982 Convention. 
 
 
5.2 FAO 
 
The FAO has become involved in the issue of the genuine link as a result of concerns about 
the activities of vessels registered under flags of convenience fishing on the high seas. In 
many regions of the world management of high seas fisheries is the responsibility of regional 
fisheries organisations. These bodies have, in most cases, adopted strict conservation and 
management measures for the stocks for which they are responsible. However, such 
measures have been and are being undermined by the owners of fishing vessels flying the flag 
of a member State of a regional fisheries organisation re-registering their vessels in a State 
(usually a flag of convenience) which is not a member of the organisation  and therefore not 
subject to its restrictions. In many areas, notably in the Northwest Atlantic, the Southern 
Ocean and Atlantic tuna fishery, this has been and continues to be a considerable problem 
and has contributed significantly to the over-exploitation of fish stocks. 
 
In recent years, FAO has been considering and developing methods and means to deter the 
use of such flags of convenience to evade internationally agreed conservation and 
management measures in high seas fishing operations. Much of this work has been in the 
context of the development and elaboration of its Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries.122  Originally the work of FAO attempted to look directly at the problem of 
reflagging, although the emphasis later changed first to looking at flag State responsibility and 
then dealing more generally with illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, including 
                                                             
121 All the examples of subsequent agreements given by Aust are ones where the parties are identical to those of the 
treaty to which the subsequent agreement relates. See A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice  (2000), pp. 
191-3. 
122 The Code of Conduct was adopted in 1995: FAO Doc. 95/20/Rev.1, reproduced on the FAO website: 
www.fao.org/fi/agreem/codecond/ficonde.asp. For further information, see W. R. Edeson, “The Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries: an Introduction”, (1996) 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
233. 
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that by vessels flying flags of convenience. More recently, however, some attention has been 
paid again to the reflagging problem, including the concept of the genuine link.  
 
The possibility of developing measures at the international level, possibly through the FAO, 
was first raised at the International Conference on Responsible Fishing, held in Cancún, 
Mexico, in May 1992. That Conference, which was attended by 67 States, adopted a 
Declaration calling on States “to take effective action, consistent with international law, to 
deter reflagging of fishing vessels as a means of avoiding compliance with applicable 
conservation and management rules for fishing activities on the high seas,”123 and calling on 
the FAO, in particular, “to draft, in consultation with relevant international organisations, an 
international Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing.”124 Similar calls were made at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992,125 
and by the FAO Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing in September 1992.126 
Consequently, when the FAO Council met for its 102nd Session in November of the same 
year, it was decided that, although the reflagging problem was one of the issues which 
should be covered in the development of a Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing, the 
problem was urgent and should be addressed immediately by the FAO, with a view to 
finding a solution - in the form of an international agreement – in the near future.127 A small 
informal Expert Group meeting was therefore convened in February 1993 to draft a 
proposed text. 
 
The Expert Group considered that it was necessary to widen the scope beyond solely the 
act of changing flags and that the proposed agreement should also include elements of the 
initial flagging process as well as the responsibility of flag States in respect of fishing vessels 
in general. Thus, in the draft text formulated by the Expert Group, provisions were included 
which dealt with, inter alia, the registration of fishing vessels, flag State responsibility and, 
importantly, allocation of flag. As regards the latter, the draft text provided that no party 
                                                             
123 Declaration of Cancun, para. 13. The text of the Declaration is reproduced in FAO, Report of the Technical 
Consultation on High Seas Fishing, FAO Fisheries Report No. 484 (Rome: FAO, 1993). 
124 Ibid., para. I.  
125 See UNCED, Agenda 21, Chapter 17, paras 17.45 and 17.52. 
126 FAO, op. cit. in n. 123. 
127 FAO Document CL 102/REP. 
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should accord a fishing vessel the right to fly its flag unless it were “satisfied, in accordance 
with its own national legislation, that there exists a genuine link between the vessel and the 
Party concerned.”128 The draft then elaborated on this requirement, by providing that, in 
determining whether or not a genuine link existed, each party should “give due weight to all 
relevant factors, including, in particular: (i) the nationality or permanent residence of the 
beneficial owner or owners of the vessel in accordance with their national law; (ii) where 
effective control over the activities of the vessel is exercised.”129   
 
During the subsequent governmental negotiations, however, it soon became clear that 
consensus would be difficult to reach on any agreement which attempted to deal with the 
allocation of flag - and, in particular, one which attempted to define more closely concepts 
such as the genuine link – or with the national registration of fishing vessels. Consequently, 
for fear that the negotiations would be dragged into a “legal quagmire”130 and delay the 
reaching of agreement indefinitely, the provisions dealing with these issues were dropped 
from the text of the Agreement which was finally adopted in 1993.131 The focus of the 
Agreement instead became the authorization of fishing on the high seas, the development of 
the concept of flag State responsibility and of mechanisms to ensure the free flow of 
information on high seas fishing operations.132 Although it is arguable that the notion of 
genuine link is still reflected in the Agreement133 - particularly in Article III(3) which prevents 
a party from authorizing a fishing vessel to fish on the high seas unless it is satisfied, taking 
into account the links that exist between it and the vessel concerned, that it is able to 
exercise effectively its responsibilities under the Agreement in respect of that vessel - in 
reality the Agreement adds little to the concept of genuine link. 
                                                             
128 Draft Agreement on the Flagging of Vessels Fishing on the High Seas to Promote Compliance with 
Internationally Agreed Conservation and Management Measures, Art. IV(1). FAO Document COFI/93/10, Annex 
2. 
129 Ibid., Art. IV(2)(a). 
130 See G. Moore, “The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Compliance Agreement”, (1995) 
10 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 412 at 413. 
131 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas, (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 968, reproduced on the FAO website at: 
www.fao.org/fi/agreem/complian/complian.asp. The Agreement has yet to enter into force. To do so, it requires 25 
acceptances but to date has received only 14: www.fao.org/fi/agreem/complian/tab1.asp. 
132 See, in particular, Articles III and VI. For further information on the Agreement, see Moore, op. cit. in n. 130, 
and D.A. Balton, “The Compliance Agreement” in E. Hey (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries 
Law  (1999), p. 31.  
133 Moore, loc. cit. in n. 130. 
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Given the high priority initially accorded to the reflagging problem by FAO, it might have 
been expected that, having failed to deal with it fully in the Compliance Agreement, further 
attention would have been given to the issue in the Code of Conduct itself. That instrument 
would have had certain advantages as a forum for elaborating principles on such a difficult 
issue because it was not designed to be legally binding. However, the Code does not deal 
directly with the issue. Nevertheless, there is one indirect reference to the matter. Article 
7.8.1 of the Code provides that “without prejudice to relevant international agreements, 
States should encourage banks and financial institutions not to require, as a condition of a 
loan or mortgage, fishing vessels or fishing support vessels to be flagged in a jurisdiction 
other than that of the State of beneficial ownership where such a requirement would have the 
effect of increasing the likelihood of non-compliance with international conservation and 
management measures.”134   
 
Recently, however, the issue of conditions for the registration of fishing vessels has been 
reactivated within the FAO. At its Twenty-third Session in 1999, the FAO’s Committee on 
Fisheries (COFI) expressed its concern at the increase in IUU fishing, including vessels 
flying flags of convenience135 and suggested that the FAO co-operate with the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO), which was due to discuss issues related to reflagging of 
fishing vessels and ship registration later in that year in its Sub-Committee on Flag State 
Implementation.136 In response to paragraph 73, the FAO conveyed the results of COFI’s 
deliberations to the Seventy-first Session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in 
May 1999.137 Little was resolved at that meeting. In the meantime the matter had also come 
before the UN General Assembly, which in a resolution adopted in November 1999 called 
on the IMO, in co-operation with the FAO and other relevant organisations, to “define the 
concept of the genuine link between the fishing vessel and the State in order to assist in the 
                                                             
134 FAO, op. cit. in n. 122. 
135 FAO, Report of the Twenty-third Session of the Committee on Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Report No. 595 
(1999), para. 72. The Report is reproduced on the FAO website at: www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/x2930e.htm. 
136 Ibid., para. 73. 
137 FAO did attempt to make its presentation to the Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation as requested by 
COFI, but the document was received too late by the IMO to be considered by this Sub-Committee and it was 
referred instead to the Maritime Safety Committee, the Sub-Committee’s parent body. 
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implementation of” the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.138 At its eighth session held in January 
2000, the Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation, recognizing that it (and the IMO 
generally) could provide assistance to the FAO, agreed to refer the matter to the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) and the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) 
for further guidance on how the issues involved could be incorporated in its (the Sub-
Committee’s) work programme. The Sub-Committee further recommended that these two 
Committees consider the formation of a joint FAO/IMO ad hoc Working Group. The 
recommendations of the Sub-Committee were endorsed at the 44th Session of the MEPC 
and at the 72nd Session of the MSC, in which it was agreed to establish a Working Group 
on IUU Fishing and Related Matters.139 The terms of reference of the Working Group do 
not, however, include any consideration of the genuine link. Rather, they include the 
preparation of a checklist of the necessary elements for effective flag State control over 
fishing vessels, including maritime safety, the prevention of marine pollution and mechanisms 
for reporting information, together with a review of the measures that may be taken by a 
port State in relation to the technical and administrative procedures for the inspection of 
other States’ vessels.140 
 
At the same time as pursuing co-operative mechanisms with the IMO, the FAO has also 
recently begun work on the development of an International Plan of Action to deal with IUU 
fishing, including fishing by flag of convenience vessels. The impetus for the Plan of Action 
was the FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries, held in March 1999, which adopted a 
Declaration outlining, inter alia, a commitment to develop such a Plan.141 In May 2000, an 
Expert Consultation on IUU fishing was held in Sydney142 and further meetings are planned 
in October 2000. Among the matters which have been proposed for inclusion in the Plan of 
                                                             
138 UN General Assembly Resolution 54/32 of November 24, 1999. 
139 IMO, Report of the Seventy-second Session of the Maritime Safety Committee, May 2000, para. 7.25. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Rome Declaration on Responsible Fisheries , para. 12(j), reproduced on the FAO website at: 
www.fao.org/fi/agreem/declar/dece.asp. The commitment was followed up by a similar call at the 116th Session of 
the FAO Council: FAO, Report of the Hundred and Sixteenth Session of Council  (1999), para. 30. 
142 See the Australian Government website at: www.affa.gov.au/ecoiuuf/. 
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Action, is the “elaboration of practical criteria for establishing a genuine link” with respect to 
fishing vessels.143 
 
It is thus possible that at some time in the future the FAO, either individually or jointly with 
the IMO, will elaborate a definition of the genuine link, at least as far as fishing vessels are 
concerned. 
 
 
 
                                                             
143 W. Edeson, Tools to Address IUU Fishing: the Current Legal Situation, Consultation Paper submitted to 
the Expert Consultation on IUU Fishing, Sydney, May 2000, reproduced on the Internet at: 
www.affa.gov.au/ecoiuuf/ausiuu20008.doc. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and Article 91 of the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea both provide that there must exist a “genuine link” 
between a State and a ship to which it has granted its nationality.  No definitio n of the term 
“genuine link” is found in either Convention nor is any explicit guidance given as to its 
meaning or as to the consequences that follow where there is no such link.  In the absence of 
such definition or explicit guidance, it has been the purpose of this study to try to discover 
what is meant by a “genuine link” and what consequences follow from its absence. 
 
It is clear that there is no consensus among States as to what is meant by the requirement of 
a genuine link.  This is shown, inter alia, by the debates at the 1958 Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, the pleadings in the IMCO case and the drafting history of both the 1986 
UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships and the 1993 FAO Compliance 
Agreement.  Equally, there is no consensus among academic writers: a wide range of 
differing views can be found in the extensive literature, some of which has been surveyed in 
sections 3.5 and 4.5 above.  An authoritative ruling as to what is meant by the genuine link 
requirement in the 1958 and 1982 Conventions could only be provided by an international 
court, such as the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea, or by means of the conclusion of a supplementary agreement to the 1982 
Convention.  In the absence of such a ruling or agreement,144 which in any case would be 
binding only on the parties to the case or to the agreement, anyone seeking the meaning of 
the genuine link requirement must do so by interpreting the provisions of Article 5 of the 
1958 Convention and Article 91 of the 1982 Convention, using the canons of treaty 
interpretation laid down by international law.  This is what this study has attempted to do.  It 
has interpreted Article 5 and Article 91 by following the rules on treaty interpretation laid 
down in Articles 31 - 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, utilising the 
materials there indicated, including the context of the provisions, their object and purpose 
                                                             
144 Although an agreement as to what is meant by a genuine link (at least as far as fishing vessels are concerned) 
may eventually result from the work of the FAO and IMO referred to in section 5.2. 
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and travaux préparatoires, and having regard to the various language texts which lie within 
the linguistic competence of the author of this study.  While the author is aware of the 
various policy considerations related to the genuine link requirement (where there is sharp 
and deep division between the protagonists of the differing viewpoints), he has tried to avoid 
allowing such policy considerations unduly to influence the exercise in interpretation 
described.  The conclusions as to the meaning of the genuine link requirement which have 
been reached on the basis of that exercise are as follows. 
 
 1. Some writers have sought to argue that the genuine link requirement does not 
concern the question of nationality but relates only to the effective exercise of flag State 
jurisdiction, and there is also a possible suggestion to this effect in the judgement of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the Saiga case.  Such a view seems 
untenable.  The genuine link requirement appears in the 1982 Convention in an article 
headed “Nationality of Ships”, and in both this Convention and the 1958 Convention the 
sentence containing the genuine link requirement follows immediately on from the provisions 
dealing with how nationality is conferred on ships.  Furthermore, the drafting history of 
Article 5 makes it clear beyond doubt that the genuine link requirement relates to nationality.   
 
 2. The granting of its nationality by a State to a ship, typically by means of 
registration, by definition creates a link between the ship and that State.  However, a mere 
administrative act, such as registration, is not in itself sufficient.  If registration in itself 
constituted the genuine link (as some writers have sought to argue), the sentence in Article 5 
of the 1958 Convention and in Article 91 of the 1982 Convention providing for a genuine 
link would be completely redundant.  The link created by registration must be “genuine”, or 
“substantiel” (in the French text) or “autentica” (in the Spanish text).  It follows from the 
ordinary meaning of the words, which is the starting point for treaty interpretation under 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that a “genuine link” is more 
than just a link.  There must be a relationship between the ship and the flag State which 
makes the link of nationality “genuine.”  That this is so follows not only from the ordinary 
meaning of the words themselves, but from the drafting history of Article 5.  It is also 
supported by Article 6 of the High Seas Convention and Article 92 of the 1982 Convention, 
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which are part of the context of the genuine link provision and which provide that a ship may 
not change its flag during a voyage or in port “save in the case of a real transfer of 
ownership or change of registry.”145  To say that any link will do would be to make the 
word “genuine” redundant, which clearly goes against a basic principle of all interpretation, 
which is to assume that every word has a purpose and a meaning.  Judge Anderson, in his 
separate opinion in the Saiga case, is surely right to observe that the requirement of a 
genuine link contains an element of good faith in the word “genuine”. 
 
 3. There is no single or obligatory criterion by which the genuiness of a link is to be 
established.  A State has a discretion as to how it ensures that the link between a ship having 
its nationality and itself is genuine, be it through requirements relating to the nationality of the 
beneficial owner or crew,146  its ability to exercise its jurisdiction over such a ship, or in some 
other way.  This follows from the wording of the first sentence of Article 5 and of Article 91, 
which leaves it to each State to fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships.  This 
conclusion is also supported by the drafting history of Article 5, where an attempt by the 
International Law Commission to prescribe specific criteria of genuineness was abandoned.  
Some support is also provided by the 1986 UN Ship Registration Convention (although the 
Convention is not a directly relevant aid in interpretation), which, even though designed to 
tighten conditions for the granting of nationality, gives a State a considerable degree of 
discretion as to how it ensures links between itself and its ships are genuine.   
 
 4. Although it is not an obligatory criterion for establishing the genuiness of a link, the 
effective exercise of jurisdiction and control over its ships is one of the principal ways in 
which a flag State may demonstrate that the link between itself and its ships is genuine.  This 
is shown by Article 5 of the High Seas Convention, which, after laying down the genuine link 
requirement, adds “in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and 
control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.”  The fact that 
                                                             
145 It is worth noting that in its commentary on draft Article 30, which eventually became Article 6 of the 1958 
Convention, the International Law Commission explained that its intention in including the provision cited was to 
“condemn any change of flag which cannot be regarded as a bona fide  transaction.” See Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1956, Vol II, p. 280. 
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this phrase was deleted from Article 91 does not disturb this conclusion as this deletion was 
simply a drafting change, designed to avoid duplication with the first sentence of Article 94.  
This conclusion is supported both by the context of Article 91, which includes Articles 94 
and 217 (which stress the need for the effective exercise of flag State jurisdiction), and the 
object and purpose of both Conventions, which are to provide for the orderly regulation of 
activities on the high seas.   
 
The criterion of the effective exercise of flag State jurisdiction does not mean, as some 
writers appear to suggest, that there must be actual effective exercise of jurisdiction and 
control over a particular ship, such that if in practice the exercise of jurisdiction was not 
effective, the genuiness of the link would be absent.  If this were so, it would be difficult for 
other States to know whether there was a genuine link without a constant examination of 
how the flag State was exercising its jurisdiction in practice.  Moreover, if the existence of a 
genuine link is a condition for the grant of nationality, it must exist at the time nationality is 
granted, and not depend on subsequent events.  Thus, the criterion of the effective exercise 
of jurisdiction and control means that a flag State must be in a position to exercise effective 
jurisdiction and control over a ship at the time that it grants its nationality to that ship.  To 
demonstrate this, a flag State must be able to show that the necessary mechanisms for 
effective exercise of jurisdiction and control are in place at the time when the ship is granted 
its nationality. Such mechanisms could include sufficient and suitably qualified personnel for 
carrying out the necessary surveys of the ship, checking the certification of the crew, etc.  It 
may also be necessary for the flag State to lay down conditions which will ensure that in 
practice it can enforce applicable international safety, labour and pollution standards against 
the owners and operators of its ships, by requiring the owner and/or operator to have a 
significant presence in its territory, such as a registered office or agent, through which any 
liability resting on the owner or operator of the ship (such as a fine or order to carry out 
repairs) may effectively be discharged.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
146 Given the complexities of ship ownership (where it is possible for the shipowning company itself to be owned 
by one or more other companies), it may be unrealistic to look for a genuine link (only) in criteria related to 
ownership. 
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 5. There is a presumption that the link between a ship and its flag State is genuine.  
In other words, it is for any State (or other entity) which challenges the genuiness of the link 
between a ship and its purported flag State to show that that link is not genuine.  This was 
suggested by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its judgement in the Saiga 
case.  It would seem that this must be so, for the opposite presumption, i.e. that a link was 
not genuine, would tend to cause at best uncertainty, at worst chaos.   
 
 6. As far as the consequences of the absence of a genuine link are concerned, as 
mentioned above neither the High Seas Convention nor the 1982 Convention state what 
such consequences are, nor do they provide any direct (or even indirect) guidance on the 
matter.  The fact that at the 1958 Conference the initial clause of the International Law 
Commission’s proposal that “for purposes of recognition of the national character of the 
ship by other States, there must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship” was 
deleted, suggests that the absence of a genuine link does not mean the loss of nationality of 
the ship concerned.  This was certainly the view taken in the Saiga case, although as pointed 
out in section 3.6 above, it is not the only possible conclusion that can be drawn.  But even if 
the judgement in the Saiga case is correct, that loss of nationality does not follow from the 
absence of a genuine link, some kind of consequence must nevertheless surely follow, 
otherwise the genuine link requirement serves no purpose; and, as mentioned above, it is a 
cardinal principle of all interpretation that the wording in a legal text has a purpose.  
Furthermore, given that the genuine link requirement relates to nationality, the consequences 
of the absence of a genuine link must also relate to nationality.  If loss of nationality is not the 
consequence, the only other consequence related to nationality which appears possible is 
that the flag State loses the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a ship which 
has no genuine link with it.  Such a conclusion is in accordance both with the spirit of the 
ruling of the International Court of Justice in the Nottbohm case, which, as seen earlier, is 
one of the historical antecedents of the genuine link requirement, and with the emerging trend 
suggested by Oxman and Bantz (see section 4.6 above), which is to deny rights to flag 
States which do not properly fulfil their duties.  It is true that in the Saiga case the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea rejected Guinea’s contention that St. Vincent 
could not exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the Saiga, but the Tribunal found that 
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in fact the link between the Saiga and St. Vincent was genuine: the Tribunal was also 
undoubtedly influenced by Guinea’s failure to raise its contention at an earlier stage of the 
proceedings. 
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